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ABSTRACT 
United Nations peace operations continue to play a vital role in international 
security, with 15 missions underway in 2007.  The UN, however, lacks the institutional 
intelligence capacity to provide guidance, high-level assessments, and tactical/operational 
intelligence support for the over 100,000 peacekeepers around the world.  The UN’s lack 
of focused capabilities is particularly surprising in the post-9/11 world and the 2003 
bombing of its headquarters in Iraq.  Since the UN’s first foray into peacekeeping in 
1948, member states, fearful of violations of their sovereignty, have blocked previous 
reform attempts.  This has forced UN operations to rely on ad hoc measures to meet their 
intelligence requirements, while the Secretary General and Security Council are at the 
mercy of member state intelligence agencies for their information.  Despite this handicap, 
some improvements have been made, particularly at the mission level.  Further, Open 
Source Intelligence (OSINT) holds great promise for addressing many of the UN’s 
intelligence requirements.  This study concludes that the UN would be well-served by 
adopting the existing NATO model for OSINT production, enabling the organization to 
effectively collate and analyze the vast information stores at its fingertips. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the question, “What practical measures can the United 
Nations (UN) take to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence support for peace 
operations?”  Following bloody attacks against UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, Somalia, and 
Rwanda in the 1990s, and particularly in the post-9/11 world, and after the bombing of 
UN headquarters in Iraq in 2003, the need for accurate and timely intelligence has never 
been higher, yet repeated calls for improving the UN’s collection and analysis capability 
have brought little progress.  This thesis reviews the historical application of intelligence 
in UN peace operations and the impact of recent proposals for improving UN 
intelligence, and provides recommendations for enhancing peacekeeping intelligence in 
today’s operational environment. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
UN peace operations play a vital role in international security.  The UN charter 
does not mention peacekeeping, yet peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have been an 
important tool for conflict resolution since the first mission in 1948.  In fact, the Human 
Security Centre at the University of British Columbia credited a rise in UN peace 
activities between 1990 and 2002 with a decline in conflict across the globe.1  From its 
ad hoc beginnings UN peacekeeping has evolved beyond simple cease-fire monitoring to 
encompass a wide range of conflict intervention and “nation-building” activities.  
Following the 1992 release of then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 
Agenda for Peace, the number of PKOs rose dramatically.  In its first 42 years the UN 
ran only 13 PKOs; in the last 20 years, it engaged in 48 more, 15 of which are active 
today.2   
 
1 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005 (New York: Oxford University Press 2005), 9. 
2 United Nations, “List of Operations”  http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/list.htm (accessed March 
4, 2007). 
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Despite this surge in activity, the UN lacks the institutional intelligence capacity 
to provide guidance, high-level assessments, and operational/tactical intelligence support 
to the forces it commands, despite a 2007 responsibility for over 100,000 personnel from 
115 countries deployed to 15 ongoing PKOs around the world.3  The organization’s 
worldwide involvement requires crisis early warning, careful pre-mission planning and 
robust information to support operations and force protection.  Furthermore, field 
operations demand the integration of intelligence at a tactical level not just for force 
protection but to monitor cease-fires and track belligerent parties’ forces.4  Although 
requirements have increased, political considerations have trumped previous efforts to 
institutionalize UN intelligence practices.  Some governments view intelligence use in the 
UN as spying on its member states.5  Member states, associating “intelligence” with 
espionage and fearful of violations of their sovereignty, have made the UN reluctant to do 
intelligence.6  The UN’s lack of standardized procedures for needed intelligence forces a 
reliance on ad hoc methods and/or member state intelligence support. 
In multilateral or alliance military operations, sharing intelligence information 
enhances trust between troop contributing countries.  Political scientist Robert Keohane 
demonstrates that an information differential exists within any given international 
organization,7 and states with the information advantage may be reluctant to share that 
information, especially intelligence, with the organization.  The UN faces this problem on 
a large scale.  This has prevented the organization from establishing an intelligence 
capability, especially at UN headquarters in New York.   
 
3 United Nations, “Department of Peacekeeping Operations Background Note 30 April 2007.”  
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm (accessed May 28, 2007). 
4 Robert E. Rehbein, Informing the Blue Helmets: The United States, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role 
of Intelligence (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen’s University Press, 1996), 24-25. 
5 A. Walter Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 414.  Also Paul 
Johnston, “No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping,” Intelligence and 
National Security 12, no. 4 (October 1997): 102-112. 
6 Brenda Connors, “Mission Possible: Making United Nations Peace Operations More Effective.”  
Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1994, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A279490&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed October 17, 2006), 17. 
7 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 93. 
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The lack of focus on intelligence is particularly surprising in a post-9/11 world—
especially following the UN’s loss of its chief representative in Iraq to a terrorist attack in 
2003.  This event drove home the need for intelligence, particularly for force protection: 
“Never before have UN unarmed personnel been so viciously and deliberately targeted, 
with such devastating effect.”8  Significantly, “intelligence” is no longer a dirty word at 
the UN.  The organization has improved PKO intelligence, particularly at the mission 
level, but much room for development remains even today.9 
Member states in 2007 had volunteered to contribute over 100,000 fielded UN 
peacekeepers.  After action reports produced within the UN say that these troop 
contributing countries need assurance that the UN will protect their soldiers.10  The need 
for intelligence has never been greater.  This thesis argues that the time is ripe for an 
updated review of UN peace operation intelligence.  Following this review, this study 
provides recommendations for improving UN intelligence in the current operational 
environment. 
C. UN INTELLIGENCE ISSUES 
The UN has made prior attempts to reform its intelligence capability.  These 
previous initiatives have faced political, bureaucratic, and structural obstacles to their 
success.  Despite these difficulties, some progress is evident, particularly at the mission 
level.  Further, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) holds great promise for addressing 
many of the UN’s intelligence requirements.  This study focuses on potential structural 
improvements the UN could pursue to enhance its intelligence performance, specifically 
 
8 Patrick Cammaert, “Conceptual, Organizational and Operational Issues Facing the United Nations in 
Providing Strategic Information and Peacekeeping Intelligence For Its Peace Support Operations” 
(Presentation, Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 
December 2003), http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/doc/Cammaert.doc (accessed February 9, 2007), 1.  At 
the time of this presentation, Maj Gen Cammaert was military advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. 
9 Simon Chesterman, “Does the UN Have Intelligence?”  Survival 48, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 156. 
10 United Nations, “United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Lessons Learned Interim Report 
August 2003,” http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/download.aspx?docid=275 (accessed January 31, 2007), 20; also 
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, “Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim 
Emergency Multinational Force,” http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/download.aspx?docid=572 (accessed February 
26, 2007), 8. 
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in the realm of OSINT.  This thesis concludes that the UN would be well-served by 
adopting the existing NATO model for OSINT production, enabling the organization to 
effectively collate and analyze the vast information stores at its fingertips. 
1. Political 
The UN is comprised of representatives of 192 different countries, making 
politics a defining feature of conducting business within the organization.  Because UN 
actions must be rooted in a consensus of member states and have the support of the 
Security Council’s permanent five members, political issues cast their shadow over every 
significant initiative.  To put it succinctly, “The U.N. secretary-general, no matter how 
skilled, is caught between big powers that refuse to make the institution fair and small 
powers that refuse to make it more efficient.  The selfishness of one side encourages the 
irresponsibility of the other.”11  These political considerations are a primary obstacle to 
effective intelligence reform.   
2. Bureaucratic 
Graham Allison presented the classic model of bureaucratic decision making 
using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study.  In his analysis, each individual 
organization in the government acts to protect its own turf.  This results in a “where you 
stand depends on where you sit” mentality, as the goals of offices and directorates cause 
leaders to stake out positions to protect their fiefdoms.12  According to Allison, this 
created confusion within an American government nominally united by the need to solve 
a crisis.   
The UN Secretariat is a massive bureaucracy employing 8,900 people from 170 
countries,13 suggesting that bureaucratic pressures similar to those within the U.S. 
 
11 Sebastian Mallaby, “Bound to Fail; UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has taken on Mission 
Impossible,” Newsweek International Edition, March 5, 2007. 
12 Graham Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in American Foreign Policy 
Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Eikenberry (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1989), 363. 
13 United Nations, Secretariat Web Site, http://www.un.org/documents/st.htm (accessed August 22, 
2007). 
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government are magnified in the UN. In addition, there is not an imperative for 
intelligence reform within the UN, so the organization is not even nominally united in 
pursuing this goal.  Any proposal to strengthen UN intelligence is likely to face resistance 
from entrenched UN bureaucrats in New York. 
3. Structural 
Another roadblock to reform is the association of intelligence with espionage.14  
To some, “the only real difference between information and intelligence is the methods 
and secretiveness by which one goes about creating the latter.”15  Opponents of 
intelligence reform may latch on to this distinction and play on small-state fears of an 
independent, covert UN intelligence capability.16  In fact, the UN often eschews the term 
“intelligence,” preferring instead “military information” or simply “information,” though 
this tendency is changing.  Yet this characterization misses a finer distinction.  While 
secret information collection may certainly constitute part of an intelligence 
organization’s function, intelligence may also refer to the analytical process and the 
products generated thereby.17  UN intelligence, then, would be the product of openly 
obtainable information, available in great quantities at UN headquarters.  In the PKO 
framework, these reports, analyzed and applied to the operational context, become open 
source intelligence (OSINT).  At UN headquarters, this can provide for early warning of 
a crisis and an integrated understanding of the nature of a given conflict.  At the 
operational and tactical levels in the field, OSINT may come from, for example, 
commercially available imagery (i.e., GoogleEarth or contracted imagery collection), and 
interviews with the local population.  For the purpose of this study, improving the UN’s 
intelligence capability means enhancing its capacity for analyzing open source 
information—that is, creating OSINT. 
 
 14 Brenda Connors, “Mission Possible: Making United Nations Peace Operations More Effective.”  
Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1994, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A279490&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed October 17, 2006), 17. 
15 Rehbein, 89. 
16 Hugh Smith, “Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping,” Survival 36, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 174. 
17 Chesterman, 150. 
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D.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rather than chronologically survey the past 15 years of literature on the subject, 
this section divides the existing published works by topical focus.  Some of the literature 
attempts an overarching view of the issues facing UN intelligence: these are grouped 
under the heading “scope of the problem.”  Other authors have focused more narrowly on 
particular niches within the existing system: structural, technological, and training-
related.  Finally, commentators have evaluated the impact of previous UN intelligence 
reform attempts.  While this study primarily focuses on potential structural measures to 
improve intelligence, there is a great deal of interplay among these categories; a concrete 
division is rarely possible.   
1.  Scope of the Problem 
Hugh Smith, of the Australian Defence Force Academy’s University College 
Department of Politics, set the tone for in-depth discussion with his oft-cited 1994 article 
“Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping.”  Smith demonstrates the need for an 
institutionalized intelligence function at UN Headquarters and in the field, while realizing 
that “[t]he concept of ‘UN intelligence’ promises to turn traditional principles of 
intelligence on their heads.”18  According to Smith, UN intelligence must be collected 
openly, and will probably become public knowledge sooner rather than later.  This 
reduces the willingness of the permanent five members of the Security Council and other 
countries to share intelligence data with the UN—and at the same time reduces the ability 
of the “blue helmets” to operate effectively. 
To examine the dynamics inherent in the openness-security tension, Canada’s 
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre’s A. Walter Dorn divided the spectrum of PKO intelligence 
gathering into “white” (permissible), “black” (prohibited), and “grey” areas.19  In 
general, the more overt the collection, the “whiter.”  Peacekeeping forces and UN 
military observers have long carried out “white” missions, but the UN has operated in 
 
18 Hugh Smith, “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping,” Survival 36, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 175.  
19 Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 420. 
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dark grey areas on occasion.  During the 1960’s mission in the Congo (ONUC), 
peacekeepers used agents to gather information about arms shipments, pushing the 
envelope of acceptability for PKO 
Marc Fontaine, writing in Peacekeeping and International Relations, also 
addressed the openness-secrecy debate, saying that the UN’s fear of infringing on 
sovereignty did not apply in the post-Cold War era.  He also says that New York must be 
able to provide assessments and continuity for tactical field units. 21  His argument 
carries even more weight in the post-9/11 w
Simon Chesterman from New York University provided the latest scholarly work 
on UN intelligence in autumn 2006.  He argues that the UN would be benefit from an 
independent analysis capability, but is skeptical that it will ever acquire one.22  He does 
not, however, explore the promise of adapting the NATO OSINT model, as this study 
does.  Instead Chesterman focuses on developing UN use of state intelligence analysis.23 
2.  Structural 
a. UN Headquarters 
Cameron Graham and James Kiras, in Peacekeeping and International 
Relations, looked at intelligence at UN Headquarters, writing a short article that offered 
the following definition of intelligence:  “it refers to that select portion of information 
that is necessary for leaders at all levels of command to make decisions.  To be more 
precise, ‘Intelligence refers to information relevant to a government's formulating and 
implementing policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats to 
those interests from actual or potential adversaries.’  Information is continually flowing 
into UN Headquarters … It is the refining and analysis of such information that the UN 
 
20 Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 426. 
 21 Marc Fontaine, “Tactical Military Intelligence, IPB and the UN,” Peacekeeping and International 
Relations 24, no. 6 (November/December 1995): 9. 
22 Chesterman, 151. 
23 Ibid., 157-159. 
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lacks.”24  They highlight the need for transparency as a major obstacle to effective UN 
intelligence.  This study develops the idea that the UN can embrace openness and 
intelligence simultaneously through effective OSINT practices. 
Writing in Intelligence and National Security, Thomas Quiggin also 
focused on the intelligence situation at UN Headquarters.  He argued that there is no 
dearth of data but with no dedicated analysts, there is a “shortage of knowledge.”25  
Norman Bowen also saw the need for crisis early warning as a main deficiency of 
peacekeeping.  The UN is unable to correlate all the data at its disposal to organize early 
and effective intervention.26  With immense open-source information resources at its 
fingertips, UN headquarters has the potential to do good analysis, if only it could muster 
the political will to institutionalize the practice. 
b.  Operational Level 
Graham and Kiras delve into UN history to show that peacekeepers have 
in fact used intelligence to accomplish their mission, regardless of the official status of 
“intelligence” within the UN.  ONUC established a fairly robust ad hoc intelligence 
structure, proving that intelligence can work in the UN, at least under some conditions.27  
Chapter II of this study elaborates on the history of UN intelligence. 
Paul Johnston also believes that “UN intelligence” need not be an 
oxymoron.  In Intelligence and National Security he contends that “the very essence of 
peacekeeping is ‘intelligence.’”28  If peacekeeping means monitoring cease-fire lines and 
 
24 Cameron Graham and James D. Kiras, “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: Definitions and 
Limitations,” Peacekeeping and International Relations 24, no. 6 (November 1995): 3.  
25 Thomas Quiggin, “Response to No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN 
Peacekeeping Missions,” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 204. 
26 Norman Bowen, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” International Journal on World 
Peace 14, no. 2 (June 1997): 10. 
 27 Graham and Kiras, 5-6. For additional details on intelligence in the Congo operation, since A. 
Walter Dorn and David J. H. Bell, “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-
64,” International Peacekeeping 2, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 11-33, available at 
http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn9_e.html (accessed 27 October 2006). 
 28 Paul Johnston, “No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping,” 
Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (October 1997): 103. 
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military withdrawals, and generally promoting transparency between belligerents, then 
the entire PKO is in fact an intelligence operation.  Without saying “intelligence,” the 
UN’s own documents acknowledge the importance of this role.29  Like Bowen and 
Graham and Kiras, Johnston sees critical shortcomings in the correlation and analysis of 
this data, particularly at the mission headquarters level.  In his view, this “operational 
level” (as distinct from strategic or tactical) of intelligence represented the biggest area 
for improvement.  Johnston saw that UN Headquarters (the strategic level) had plenty of 
data flowing in, and the army battalions on loan from member states (the tactical level) 
typically brought their own organic intelligence capability with them.30  In fact the UN 
has made significant strides at the operational level.  These changes are detailed in 
Chapter III. 
Pär Eriksson, with Sweden’s National Defense Research Establishment in 
Stockholm, agreed with the focus on the operational level and sketched a general 
framework for intelligence requirements at that level.  His three broad requirement 
categories are 1) the ethnic situation, 2) the socio-economic situation, and 3) the attitude 
of local leaders and civilians.31  He left these requirements very general, though others 
went into more depth on the subject. 
Retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer Walter Clarke and Ambassador 
Robert Gosende provided the literature’s most detailed list of specific PKO intelligence 
requirements.  The major categories these fall in are shown in Figure 1.  These are the 
areas the commander needs intelligence to plan the broad overview of the mission.32   
 
 
 29 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on UN Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United Nations, 2003), 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Handbook%20on%20UN%20PKOs.pdf 
(accessed 10 October 2006), 60.  Along with “Support to Peacemaking and Political Negotiations” and 
“Providing a Secure Environment,” “Observation and Monitoring” (i.e., intelligence gathering) may be the 
main function of a UN military force. 
30 Johnston, 108. 
 31 Pär Eriksson, “Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 10, no 1 (Spring 1997): 7-8. 
 32 Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, “Keeping the Mission Focused: The Intelligence Component in 
Peace Operations,” Defense Intelligence Journal 5, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 60-63. 
Clarke and Gosende do not provide a complete catalog of requirements.  To this list can 
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OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Figure 1. Operational-level intelligence requirements33 
Unlike Clarke and Gosende, Eriksson examined some of the intelligence 
sources available to UN forces, as shown in Figure 2.  UN peacekeepers have direct 
access to the population, and thus have access to very detailed localized information—it 
is analysis and correlation that UN missions lack.  The more technical sources Eriksson 
identified may not be available to all missions, or may be restricted to only certain 
national contingents.  Political considerations will dictate the extent of technical and 
national intelligence sharing in the mission. 
• Non-Governmental 
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• National Intelligence Sources 
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• Observation Posts 
• Interviews with population 
POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES 




                                                
Figure 2.   Potential Intelligence Sources Available to UN Missions34 
 
33 Clarke and Gosende, 60-63. 
34 Eriksson, 8-11. 
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A great deal more information beyond these sources is openly available 
for use in intelligence products.  These additional OSINT resources are discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
c.  Tactical Level 
When member states send a battalion to a UN mission, the unit typically 
deploys with its own intelligence function.  This organic capability varies to the extent 
that the contributing state trains and equips its battalion’s intelligence personnel.  Thus, 
there is no standardized intelligence function at the unit level of a UN mission. 
Moving down the spectrum to the tactical level, Bradley Runions and 
Richard Roy of Canada’s Royal Military College discuss the gap in intelligence on land 
mines.  With mines one of the principal threats to peacekeepers and noncombatants alike, 
such information is vital to protect the force and civilians in the operations area.35  Land 
mine education resources are plentiful, but the sheer bulk of data inhibits use at the 
tactical level.  Further, the land mine experts in explosive ordnance disposal are 
unprepared to teach deploying peacekeepers about the broad range of land mine 
employment.36  
Also at the tactical level, Fontaine recommended the UN develop a 
methodology to apply intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to PKOs.  He calls 
improved intelligence a “necessity” given the UN’s involvement in intra-state conflicts 
with their attendant factions and lack of front lines.  Fontaine realized the UN faced 
resource constraints and saw the United States as a prime contributor to improving the 
UN’s IPB capability.37 
Troops in the field also realize their need for improved intelligence.  
Swedish peacekeepers returning from the mission in the Bosnia (UNPROFOR) called for 
 
 35 Bradley Runions and Richard Roy, “The Mine Threat in Peacekeeping Operations, Part One: 
Existing Mine Intelligence Sources,” Peacekeeping and International Relations 26, no. 1 
(January/February 1997): 9. 
36 Runions and Roy, “Mine Threat,” 8. 
37 Fontaine, 12. 
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better understanding of the causes of the war and the ethnic situation.38  As Eriksson and 
Clarke and Gosende pointed out, this is a primary intelligence requirement for 
peacekeeping. 
3.   Technological 
In a series of articles for Peacekeeping and International Relations, Peter Jones 
outlined the role of overt aerial reconnaissance in historical peacekeeping missions.  He 
concludes that aerial reconnaissance can be applied in a UN context, but the details of the 
mission will define the extent to which it can function.39  James Kiras agreed, and saw 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as an outstanding source of PKO intelligence.40  While 
this makes sense, UAVs have remained under the control of their owning countries even 
when employed in support of UN missions.  Despite their obvious utility in information 
gathering, widespread deployment of UN-controlled UAVs is unlikely.41 
Runions and Roy recommended technological solutions to the mine intelligence 
problem.  They specify existing sources of information and recommend deploying 
peacekeepers be provided a CD-ROM containing relevant data.42  Additionally, they 
propose a comprehensive internet-based mine intelligence database for maintenance of 
current information.43  The problem with their proposals is that they are specific to the 
Canadian military.  While Canada is historically a very active peacekeeping participant, 
other countries may not have the resources to outfit their troops with such technology. 
 
 38 Eva Johansson, “The Role of Peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish Experience in UNPROFOR,” 
Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 462. 
 39 Peter Jones, “Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance III: The Post Cold War Era,” Peacekeeping and 
International Relations 23, no. 4 (July 1994): 5.  See also Peter Jones, “Peacekeeping and Aerial 
Surveillance,” Peacekeeping and International Relations 22, no. 2 (March/April 1993): 3-4; and Peter 
Jones, “Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance II: From Yemen to the End of the Cold War,” Peacekeeping 
and International Relations 22, no. 5 (September/October 1993): 3-5. 
 40 James D. Kiras, “Intelligence, Peacekeeping and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Peacekeeping and 
International Relations 24, no. 6 (November/December 1995): 7.  
41 Kiras, 10. 
42 Runions and Roy, “Mine Threat,” 9. 
 43 Bradley Runions and Richard Roy, “A Proposed Mine Intelligence Net,” Peacekeeping and 
International Relations 26, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 6. 
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4.   Training 
Few authors directly address the need for training.  Instead, training requirements 
must be inferred from the various proposed solutions.  Since PKOs are composed of 
contingents from multiple countries, training levels vary from unit to unit.  Fontaine’s 
suggestion for a UN IPB methodology, for instance, requires a high degree of specialized 
training to learn the intricate IPB process.  For example, the US Joint Doctrine for IPB is 
nearly 200 pages long.44 
This does not mean the training issue is insurmountable.  As U.S. forces in Haiti 
gave way to a UN mission (UNMIH) in 1995, the U.S. Army instituted a program to train 
the multi-national UNMIH Headquarters staff.  Walter Kretchik from Bilkent University 
in Ankara, Turkey, detailed the training effort.  Political considerations shaped the 
program; both the Army and the UN did not want the UNMIH staff “Americanized.”  In 
the end, a multinational consensus on the syllabus emerged.45  Though an ad hoc effort, 
the training proved successful:  the UN commander in Haiti, American Major General 
Joseph Kinzer, said the UNMIH staff was the most effective UN staff in history.46 
5.  Previous Reform Attempts 
The earliest calls for intelligence improvement came shortly after the Agenda for 
Peace.  For instance, Arms Control Today in 1992 noted that many airfields and weapons 
caches in Bosnia needed better UN monitoring.47  The UN did take some steps to address 
the shortcomings in PKO intelligence.  In 1993, the UN created a 24/7 Situation Center 
as a preliminary step toward improving information flow, though it left much to be 
desired.48  Though less than a fully functional command-and-control center, the “SitCen” 
 
 44 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-01.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office: 2000). 
 45 Walter E. Kretchik, “Multinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace Operations: The Case of the 
U.S. Army and UNMIH 1994-1995,” Armed Forces and Society 29, no 3 (Spring 2003): 407. 
46 Kretchik, 406. 
 47 Arms Control Today, “U.N. Peacekeepers Face New Hurdles as Missions, Responsibilities, 
Expand,” Arms Control Today 22, no. 9 (November 1992): 33. 
48 Smith, 178-179. 
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still represented a step in the right direction.  A concurrent effort to improve PKO 
management through the use of “gratis” officers on loan from their (mostly rich) home 
countries crumbled under political pressure from poorer states.49  More information on 
these attempted reforms can be found in Chapter II. 
American support to any UN intelligence effort would be invaluable.  In 1993 
U.S. Navy Commander Charles Williams at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
in Washington, DC noted that the United States in the post-cold war era “has neither the 
desire nor resources to impose and enforce a ‘Pax Americana.’”50  He recommended the 
United States step up its contributions to PKO intelligence, “contingent on the UN 
establishing a system of controls and security controls”51 to protect U.S.-provided 
information.  Essentially he feared the release of intelligence to the UN could result in 
loss of classified or sensitive data, sources, and methods.  A year later, Brenda Connors 
from the U.S. Naval War College said “U.S. leadership is desperately needed” to enhance 
the UN’s PKO effectiveness.52  She argued, inter alia, that America should help the UN 
to expand its capacity to handle intelligence.53    
In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked former Algerian Foreign 
Minister Lakhdar Brahimi to chair a panel to review all facets of UN PKO and provide 
recommendations.  The panel’s findings, known as the Brahimi Report, called for 
improvements to PKO intelligence at all levels, from the tactical (field) level up through 
UN headquarters in New York.  Although the panel did not concentrate exclusively on 
intelligence, the report stated that at the operational and tactical level, peacekeepers need 
 
 49 Robert L. McClure and Morton Orlov II, “Is the UN Peacekeeping Role in Eclipse?”  Parameters 
29, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 100, 103. 
 50 Charles A. Williams, “Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Executive Research 
Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1993, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A277016&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed October 17, 2006), 1. 
51 Ibid., 21. 
52 Connors, 6. 
53 Ibid., 17. 
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more detailed intelligence to enhance their ability of peacekeepers to deter violence. 54  
At the strategic level, the panel recommended creation of an independent analysis arm to 
support the Secretary General.  This would be an expansion of the existing Situation 
Center to be known as the EISAS (Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) 
Information and Strategy Analysis Secretariat).55  The EISAS recommendation was 
never implemented, despite evidence of the need for improved analytical capability.56  
Still, the Brahimi Report represents the most comprehensive review of PKO undertaken 
by the UN.  Chapter III assesses the report’s impact on UN opera
Shortly after the Brahimi Report’s release, scholars began to provide tentative 
analysis of its utility.  For the most part these were long on summary and short on 
analysis.  For instance, Norwegian Colonel Jon Lilland wrote a paper at the U.S. Army 
War College purporting to examine the effects of the report on PKO.  Unfortunately, he 
did not get into any detail; all the references to the report were to the Executive 
Summary.57  Brian Zittel of the New York Times’ editorial board research staff gives a 
very brief overview.  He makes the point that Brahimi essentially establishes a “Powell 
Doctrine” for PKO when it says that every mission should have an attainable mandate 
and enough resources to achieve it.58  Commandant Brendan O’Shea of the Irish Army 
critiques Brahimi in several areas, but sees EISAS as a positive recommendation.59  
 
 54 United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN Document 
A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2000, x.  The report provided 20 major recommendations to improve peacekeeping, 
each with multiple sub-recommendations.  These ranged from preventative actions, through civil 
administration, logistics, and information technology to operational and structural reform.  Intelligence was 
only a small part of the overall report.  This study refers to the “Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations” as the “Brahimi Report” throughout the text. 
55 Ibid., xi. 
56 Isa Blumi, “Kosova: From the Brink—and Back Again,” Current History 100, no. 649 (November 
2001): 374.  Blumi says, “The ultimate lesson to be learned from Kosova, therefore, is that there is a 
desperate need to develop a more sensitive methodological approach to diplomacy, particularly in the 
intelligence gathering field.” 
57 Jon B. Lilland, “United Nations Peace Operations and the Brahimi Report,” Strategy Research 
Project, US Army War College, 2001, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A391135&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed October 17, 2006), 15-17. 
58 Brian E. Zittel, “The Brahimi Report: At a Glance,” Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 2 
(Spring 2002), 502.  
59 Brendan O’Shea, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Peacekeeping and International 
Relations 30, no. 4 (April-September 2001): 18. 
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David Malone from the International Peace Academy in New York and Ramesh Thakur, 
vice-rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo, provide the most in-depth review 
of the report as a whole, though they do not address the intelligence question directly.  
They do agree that PKO face serious challenges, and Brahimi’s recommendations “to 
address the near-catastrophic drift in the DPKO” are excellent.60 
Surprisingly little new research on UN PKO intelligence has been published since 
the Brahimi Report.  Lawrence Cline, a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer and a 
professor at American Military University, looked at intelligence in U.S. peace 
operations, with lessons from the UN.  His focus on the American military intelligence 
system does not translate directly to a UN context, but he does acknowledge that barriers 
to intelligence in UN PKO are slowly falling.61  Incremental progress notwithstanding, in 
2005 Retired Indian Major General Dipkanar Banerjee, Director of the Institute for Peace 
and Conflict Studies, identified the continuing salience of Brahimi’s unimplemented 
EISAS proposal.62   
The organization still has immense potential to grow its intelligence processes, 
though not without some difficulty.  The lack of scholarly focus on intelligence is 
particularly surprising in a post-9/11 world.  The 2006 article published by New York 
University’s Simon Chesterman, described above, is a refreshing revisit of the UN 
intelligence topic, though it stops short of describing a potential model for an autonomous 
UN analysis capability.  This thesis attempts to fill that void, and focuses on structural 
changes the UN might attempt to improve its intelligence capability.  
E.   COUNTERPOINTS 
Intelligence reform within the UN has its critics.  Some question its utility given 
the myriad other problems facing peacekeeping.  Political sovereignty concerns prevent 
 
60 David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, “UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?” Global Governance 
7, no. 1 (January-March 2001): 15. 
61 Lawrence E. Cline, “Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and Stability Operations,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 179. 
62 Dipankar Banerjee, “Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping: A Perspective from Asia,” International 
Peacekeeping 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 24. 
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many states from fully supporting an improved UN intelligence capability.  Finally, there 
is the question of whether the UN, or any international organization, can be trusted with 
sensitive information. 
1. Why Intelligence? 
To date, UN peace operations have had a mixed record of success, and there is no 
shortage of areas for improvement.  Malone and Thakur divide the problems into policy, 
managerial, and operational concerns.  The Security Council gives missions ambitious 
broad and ambitious mandates based in large part on political considerations—and then 
often fails to provide the field operation with adequate resources for its assigned tasks.  
Peacekeeping staff posts are too often filled on the basis of politics, not merit. 63  State-
building efforts under UN aegis have a mixed record, and even the relatively successful 
Timor-Leste operation saw a resumption of violence.64  Most UN troops come from 
developing countries, while rich states contribute most of the funding.65  Intelligence is 
but a small part of the entire system, “not a panacea for deeper systemic problems.”66  
Therefore, intelligence may not offer as much assistance in improving the overall record 
of PKOs as might be the case if the UN system otherwise was running smoothly. 
Still, the need for improved intelligence is well documented.  The UN itself is 
slowly becoming accustomed to this mode.  The first-ever draft UN peacekeeping 
doctrine reflects the importance of analysis as embodied in the Joint Mission Analysis 




63 Malone and Thakur, 12-14. 
64 Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 (Boulder & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 2. 
65 United Nations, “DPKO Factsheet, 31 March 2007,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf 
(accessed May 28, 2007). 
66 Rehbein, 3. 
67 Challenges Project, “Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations—Draft 2,” 
August 7, 2006, www.challengesproject.net/roach/images/doc/UN_Capstone_Docrine_Rev2_ESMT_26-
28_Sep_2006.doc (accessed March 4, 2007), 35.  The JMAC will be more fully described in Chapter III. 
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noted in Chapter IV.  Given the requirements for improved intelligence and the relatively 
poor state of the UN’s existing capability, a relatively small investment can provide great 
returns. 
2. Sovereignty 
A concerted strategic intelligence effort at UN headquarters does not exist.  
Brahimi’s EISAS recommendation failed because member states did not want their 
internal affairs to be the focus of a UN collection effort.68  Martha Finnemore 
documented a shift in the consideration of international intervention, and showed that the 
UN now considers despots as threats to peace and security.69  Some autocratic leaders 
may fear becoming the target of unwanted UN attention and possible intervention if the 
organization became officially aware of the nature of their policies.  Some small states 
saw “the potential for early warning to conflict with state sovereignty.”70  The counter to 
this argument is that there would be no secret UN espionage agency, no “CIA for the 
UN,” since the information is already largely resident within the UN system.71  
According to Chesterman, the distinction between collection and analysis requires better 
definition to establish that UN intelligence does not violate sovereignty.72  Furthermore, 
no UN intervention is possible without both the approval of the Security Council and the 
willingness for states to provide troops and equipment.  Interventions are not likely to be 
undertaken lightly—UN deployments reached an all-time high in October 2006,73 and 
“overstretch” is a very real concern.74  There is neither an incentive nor capability for the 
organization to mount an operation without sufficient cause or the political will of troop 
 
68 Chesterman, 154. 
69 Martha Finnemore, “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Purpose of 
Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 56. 
70 Chesterman, 154. 
71 Graham and Kiras, 3. 
72 Chesterman, 157. 
73 United Nations, “United Nations Military, Police Deployment Reaches All-time High in October,” 
UN Press Release PKO/152, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/pko152.doc.htm (accessed May 29, 
2007). 
74 Center on International Cooperation, 8. 
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contributing countries.  The norm of non-intervention remains very strong—witness the 
reluctance to take decisive action in Rwanda in 1994 or to compel an end to genocide in 
present-day Darfur. 
The success of JMACs in several UN operations is evidence that member states 
can accept some form of UN intelligence capacity, at least at the mission level.  This may 
be due, in part, to their acknowledgment of the importance of intelligence to the 
operation.  It also suggests recognition that UN intelligence does not necessarily threaten 
the sovereignty of the member states. 
3. Dependence and Trust 
Intelligence capabilities have always rested with states, not international 
organizations like the UN.  The big powers demand control of their intelligence assets, 
and tend to maintain their control of information.75  This follows Keohane’s theory that 
information asymmetry will exist inside international organizations.  Since the permanent 
five members of the Security Council enjoy this information advantage, they may be less 
inclined to approve an independent UN intelligence capability.  According to Robert 
Rehbein at Queen’s College in Kingston, Ontario, this information dependence is to the 
organization’s detriment, and opens the door to manipulation.  Additionally, he points out 
that not even U.S. intelligence has information about every point on the globe—
especially in the countries where the UN often operates.76  As Chesterman argues, an 
independent UN voice is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a UN operation.77  
In other words, an autonomous analysis capacity frees the collective group from 
accusations of being a tool of the maj
F.  STUDY DESIGN 
Chapter II sets the stage through examination of the history of intelligence in the 
UN during the Cold War and the 1990s.  The organization is no stranger to the use of 
 
75 Russett and Sutterlin, 81. 
76 Rehbein, 55, 45 
77 Chesterman, 160. 
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intelligence, but has repeatedly relied on ad hoc measures to accomplish the intelligence 
function.  While certain efforts have proven more or less successful, UN officials have 
given little official recognition to the need for intelligence—let alone institutionalization 
of intelligence practices—until publication of the Brahimi Report.  Chapter III begins 
with the Brahimi Report and analyzes UN intelligence successes and failures since its 
2000 release.  Chapter IV explores the concept of OSINT and the well-developed NATO 
OSINT doctrine.  Chapter V concludes the UN could adapt the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) model to build an effective intelligence function. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF UN INTELLIGENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations found itself running military peacekeeping operations 
beginning with its first military observer mission in 1948.  The year before, the Security 
Council had experimented with the use of fact-finding missions partially staffed by 
military officers.  The scale of UN operations expanded with a full-scale military 
deployment to the Sinai in the late 1950s.  Early peacekeeping operations (PKOs) had to 
rely on ad hoc methods of command and control, including the management of 
intelligence.78  Today’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), created in 
1992, has improved mission management, but in the realm of intelligence the tendency 
for ad hoc measures continues.  In 2001, DPKO established the Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Unit (PBPU) in an effort to record lessons learned, but its coverage is 
haphazard.79  This chapter answers the question, “What lessons can twentieth century 
PKOs teach the UN?”  Cold War missions set many precedents for UN PKO; in the early 
post-Cold War era, the UN attempted to apply the same models to more complex 
situations like Somalia and Bosnia, with disastrous results.  The Brahimi Report is a 
logical breakpoint in the discussion, and the cause for this chapter’s focus on pre-2000 
operations. 
In point of fact, the UN is no stranger to the use of intelligence.  From its earliest 
days the Security Council used fact finding and observation missions to provide 
information about threats to peace and security.  As peace operations grew more 
complex, technical survey teams deployed to prospective mission areas in advance of the 
main force to get the lay of the land. 
 
 
78 Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, “The U.N. in a New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 
(Spring 1991): 73.  
79 John Terence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 193.   
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1. Observation Missions 
Observation missions as a means to inform the Security Council predate the 
establishment of peacekeeping operations.  In contrast to PKOs, observer missions are 
typically smaller and not intended to either guard territory or interpose between 
belligerents.80  Therefore, military observers usually go unarmed.81  This is true even 
when observers work in the same mission with an armed peacekeeping force.  Because 
they do not present a threat to any conflict party, the UN has used observation missions 
as fact finders to investigate conflict areas. 
In 1947, the UN established a Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB).  
The mission’s military observers patrolled the northern border of Greece to determine the 
extent of foreign support for communist guerillas fighting Athens.82  The mission, which 
lasted until 1953, is considered successful in helping to stabilize the political situation in 
Greece.83  UNSCOB observers in the field acted as intelligence collectors.  They 
monitored cross-border traffic and interrogated guerillas captured by security forces.  
Notably, broadcast monitoring allowed the mission to determine that the pro-communist 
“Free Greece” radio station originated in Yugoslavia.84  Unlike later missions, UNSCOB 
reported to the UN General Assembly instead of the Security Council.  The Security 
Council would take the lead in subsequent missions. 
Both the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) monitored peace settlements on 
behalf of the Security Council.  Starting in 1948 and continuing today, UNTSO military 
observers kept watch over Israel’s international frontiers.  The mission’s main tools are 
 
80 Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), 6. 
81 Diehl, 7. 
82 Karl Th. Birgisson, “United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans,” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993), 77. 
83 Diehl, 27. 
84 Birgisson, “United Nations Special Committee,” 81. 
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observation posts, ground patrols, and inspections of demilitarized areas,85 though it 
spends much time addressing belligerents’ complaints.86  Although UNTSO has seen 
multiple wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the UN continues the mission as a 
confidence-building measure.87 
A similar situation exists in South Asia.  UNMOGIP began as a means to monitor 
the Pakistan-India cease-fire in 1949.  Initial intelligence efforts included ground and air 
reconnaissance of the mission area.88  Throughout its life, the mission reported on troop 
movements and investigated complaints from each party to the conflict.89  Despite the 
recurrence of war and the non-cooperation of India, the mission remains in place today.  
Perhaps its most important contribution is as a sign that the international community 
remains interested in peace in the area.90 
Observation missions are today usually integrated with larger PKOs.  The current 
UN mission in Congo, for example, has over 16,000 peacekeeping troops complemented 
by 731 military observers.91  The Security Council also uses purpose-built monitoring 
groups to report on particular issues.  In 1993, UN Security Council Resolution 1519 
established the Somalia Monitoring Group.  Essentially, this is an intelligence collection 
and analysis arm chartered specifically to “investigate violations of the arms embargo … 
carry out field based investigations … [and] assess the progress of the arms embargo.”92  
The results of this effort can be controversial.  The Group’s July 2007 report accused 
 
85 Birgisson, “United Nations Special Committee,” 94. 
86 Diehl, 28. 
87 Mona Ghali, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization,” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993), 84. 
88Karl Th. Birgisson, “United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,” in The 
Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 278 
89 Diehl, 28. 
90Birgisson, “United Nations Military Observer Group,” 273. 
91 United Nations, “Department of Peacekeeping Operations Background Note.” 
92 United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1519-2003, UN Document 
S/RES/1519 (2003), 2. 
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Eritrea of sending “huge quantities of arms” to Somali insurgents.93  Eritrea denies the 
claim though the Bush administration is contemplating placing Eritrea on the list of state 
sponsors of terrorism.94  These ramifications highlight the potential effectiveness of a 
UN intelligence operation, and also explain why many countries are loath to accept the 
establishment of an institutionalized UN intelligence capability.  In any case, the Security 
Council extended the Monitoring Group’s mandate in Resolution 1766 of July 2007. 
2. Technical Surveys 
As early as 60 days prior to a peacekeeping mission’s deployment, DPKO sends a 
technical survey team to the operating area.95  It “report[s]on the political, diplomatic, 
military and administrative support situation.”96  Usually consisting of 17-20 people, the 
team is weighted toward preparing the logistics of the impending deployment, but 
mission planners and military officers are also included.  According to Mr. John Otte, a 
former technical survey team member, the effort is “essentially a reconnaissance 
mission.”97 
The team’s findings go to the Secretary General for him to use in formulating a 
report on mission establishment; that report is furnished to the Security Council.  
Infrastructure information, including data on roads, airports, and seaports, forms a large 
part of the report.  The survey team also investigates potential peacekeeper deployment 
 
93 United Nations, “Letter dated 17 July 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security 
Council,” UN Document S/2007/436, 3. 
94 Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. May Add Eritrea to List of Nations Backing Terrorists,” New York Times, 
August 18, 2007. 
95 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on UN Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, 131. 
96 Center for Civil Military Relations, “Operational Support, Chapter 1” (Course Material, “Planning 
Peace Operations Course,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006), 25.  Although actual UN pre-
mission surveys are not publicly available, training documents from the “Planning Peace Operations 
Course” are adapted from original surveys, and reveal their general contents.   
97 John Otte, interview by author, July 19, 2007 at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  Mr. 
Otte is former U.S. Army officer.  He served as a “gratis” officer at UN Headquarters from 1995-1999 and 
is a veteran of three UN PKOs.  Currently he is adjunct faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School through 
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sites and evaluates them on sustainability and operational significance.  Additional 
information such as terrain and climatology is also included.98   
In short, the technical survey team’s work forms a pre-mission assessment of the 
situation, similar to what one might expect to find in the planning documents for any 
modern military operation.  It is not an intelligence product per se, but fills some of the 
same roles.  The technical survey, however, does not have a great capability for 
intelligence collection, and thus can leave gaps in the UN planner’s knowledge.  Still, this 
is an improvement from the early days of peacekeeping, when very little information was 
available. 
B. THE COLD WAR 
The East-West standoff curtailed UN Security Council cooperation and limited 
the employment and roles of blue-helmeted UN troops.  Competition between the United 
States and Soviet Union threatened to deadlock the UN Security Council during 
contentious discussions.  Thus, the UN could not take any action which might run against 
the interests of either superpower.  The net result was to limit Cold War UN action “to 
the margins of global security.”99  From its creation in 1945 to the thawing of U.S.-USSR 
relations in 1988, the UN ran only 13 “blue helmet” PKOs—and created none between 
1978 and 1988.  These early missions were important in precedent setting in all aspects of 
mission management and employment, including intelligence.  Sweden’s Dag 
Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary General from 1953-1961, outlined the norms that should 
govern all UN PKOs: impartiality, consent of the parties, and use of force only in self-
defense.100  Even Secretary General Hammarskjöld recognized the need for intelligence, 
though he did not want to see UN operations take on clandestine operations.101 
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The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai from 1956 to 1967 was the first 
full-scale PKO, and thus became the model for future operations.102  From its inception 
in 1960, ONUC (the French acronym for the first UN operation in the Congo) 
foreshadowed the “peacekeeping” missions of the early 1990s.  By its 1964 conclusion, 
ONUC had transformed from a peacekeeping and supervisory role to full scale military 
operation and direct intervention in Congolese affairs.103  This departure from the 
recently promulgated norms of impartiality and non-aggression caused the UN to view 
ONUC as an aberration.  Other notable missions begun in this period were the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP 1964-present), UNEF II (Sinai, 1973-1979), 
and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, Golan Heights, 1974-present).  
These operations demonstrated the UN’s ad hoc approach to intelligence. 
1. UNEF 
UNEF deployed to the Sinai in 1956 to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces 
(Israeli, French, and British) from the Sinai Peninsula, patrol the border areas, and 
supervise the ceasefire.104  Secretary General Hammarskjöld had just two days to plan 
the operation.  Mona Ghali, in her research for the Henry L. Stimson Center in 
Washington, DC, claims that Hammarskjöld had no intelligence on the situation to guide 
him.105  This is not entirely true; in fact military observers from the already-in-place 
UNTSO mission provided some information.106  Fortunately the political situation was 
such that all parties to the conflict cooperated with UNEF for the most part, and the lack 
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observation and monitoring function assigned to UNEF essentially made it an 
intelligence-collection organization for the UN, although it did not operate covertly in 
any way.   
Washington allowed the UNEF commander to view, but not maintain, certain 
U.S. satellite images.107  Despite this input, it would be the mission itself, using UN 
troops and equipment contributed by member states, which would gather most of 
UNEF’s intelligence.  In addition to observation posts and infantry patrols, UNEF 
employed air reconnaissance to help patrol the area.108 
Canada sent a small detachment of five aircraft and fewer than 100 men to UNEF.  
This unit participated in UNEF operations from 1963 to 1965, supplementing the 
mission’s ground patrol activities. Aircraft watched more area and could direct 
peacekeepers to investigate suspicious activity.  Budget pressures within the UN forced 
cut backs to the aerial reconnaissance capability.  This was not because UNEF 
commanders found aerial intelligence irrelevant—on the contrary, mission leadership was 
prepared to sacrifice troop strength to maintain the air surveillance capability—but 
because the Secretary General deemed the political impact of troops’ physical presence to 
be a higher priority.109  Though these air operations were not a major player in the 
conduct of the operation, they did set the precedent for UN use of aircraft to collect 
intelligence.  In its next operation, air reconnaissance would prove invaluable to the UN 
peacekeepers. 
2. ONUC 
ONUC, the 1960-64 Congo operation, was an attempt to apply the UNEF 
peacekeeping framework in a context far removed from its 1956 origins.  This time, the 
UN intervened in an internal conflict and had difficulty forming a political consensus on 
the scope of its role.  This forced the UN to constantly improvise and change its 
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policies.110  The organization did not have a firm foundation on which to begin planning 
for the ONUC mission.  Without its own intelligence arm, the UN had to depend on 
xenophobic Congolese leaders and self-interested member states for intelligence.  This 
resulted in UN planners (and Secretary General Hammarskjöld in particular) lacking an 
appreciation of the situation on the ground and were not in a position to accurately 
outline troop, equipment, and mandate requirements.111  The combination of poor 
information and the East-West-divided Security Council made the mission weak from the 
start.112  Consequently, ONUC had fewer than 20,000 troops from 30 different countries 
(at its February 1963 peak) to cover an area roughly the size of Western Europe.113  As 
ONUC found itself involved in combat operations, the need to focus its limited tactical 
resources through improved intelligence became apparent. 
When it began in 1960, the mission’s mandate was to support Congo’s territorial 
integrity and monitor the withdrawal of Belgian mercenaries.  From November 1961 until 
it ended in 1964, ONUC’s role was to quell the rebellion in Katanga province.  Once in 
country, the mission’s lack of intelligence proved to be a major obstacle for ONUC’s 
force commander.114  Research by Ernest Lefever, then at the Brookings Institution, 
directly after the operation also showed intelligence to be a problem,115 though no in-
depth study of the intelligence issue was attempted.  Years later, this situation prompted 
perhaps the most in-depth study of intelligence in a UN operation.  A. Walter Dorn and 
David Bell from Canada’s Royal Military Academy published this in a 1995 issue of 
International Peacekeeping.     
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According to Dorn and Bell, ONUC made do without any intelligence capability 
for its initial six months.  At the same time, the UN received no intelligence from its 
members.  As the ONUC’s mandate grew, out of necessity it established a “military 
information branch” (MIB) at force headquarters in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) to carry 
out intelligence analysis for the force commander.116  The MIB was the UN’s first 
intelligence organization at any level, and began the UN’s use of “information” as the 
euphemism for “intelligence.”117   
Although the MIB had more officers—nine—than any other branch at ONUC 
headquarters, it suffered from a deficiency of intelligence experts.118   Despite resource 
shortcomings, the MIB evolved into a multidisciplinary organization, incorporating aerial 
photoreconnaissance, human intelligence from informers and detained mercenaries, and 
radio intercept analysis.119  ONUC made extensive use of MIB products in fighting the 
Katangese rebels. 
The mission possessed a limited capability for aerial reconnaissance.  Limited 
numbers of troops coupled with a lack of roads and maps meant that UN troops could not 
effectively patrol everywhere, and elevating the importance of aerial surveillance. 
Initially the air effort consisted of debriefings of transport aircraft crews rather than a 
focused collection effort.  As a result, ONUC had little capability to find Katanga’s troop 
formations and build ground- and air- orders-of-battle.  Late in the operation, a Swedish 
air reconnaissance unit arrived and provided a windfall of intelligence to the 
operation.120  The UN’s air arm, consisting of four Ethiopian F-86 and five Swedish J29 
fighter jets, along with four Indian Canberra bombers,121 was then able to destroy most 
of Katanga’s small air force on th
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ONUC also gathered human intelligence through various mechanisms.  ONUC 
detained and interrogated foreign mercenaries in accordance with the Geneva 
Conventions.123  Mission personnel interviewed defectors and attempted to set up a 
network of informants.  This attempt was hampered by a lack of funds for buying 
information.124  This collection effort resulted in modest success, though not all of 
ONUC’s sources proved entirely trustworthy.  A 1962 operation based on informant 
reports discovered a supply of aircraft spare parts, preventing an improvement to the 
small Katanga air capability.125  In the end, the human intelligence effort was limited by 
resources and also concerns about a backlash against the UN resulting from such direct 
activities.  ONUC leadership decided that the risk of “a fall from grace” resulting from 
“employing spies” would outweigh any potential gains.126 
Despite intercepts and code-breaking clearly falling into the realm of intelligence, 
UN military advisor Major General Indar Jit Rikhye of India deemed these practices 
“non-intrusive” and thus acceptable for UN use.127  Though code breaking was not well-
resourced,128 listening to open broadcasts provided ONUC with valuable intelligence on 
troop movements and arms caches.129  This information aided the UN’s “Operation 
Grandslam” in December 1962 and January 1963, which put a final end to the Katangese 
secession.130   
3. Other Cold War Missions 
Other Cold War missions showcased intelligence successes and failures.  ONUC 
ended in 1964; the same year saw the establishment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP).  This operation was intended to prevent escalation of the conflict 
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between ethnic Greeks and Turks on Cyprus.  The conflict remains unsettled, 
necessitating the continued presence of the UN peacekeepers.131  Especially in the 
mission’s first decade, lack of an intelligence capacity led to surprises.  For instance, the 
UN did not grasp the size and scope of Greek army camps on the island.  The Greeks had 
hidden an entire brigade, the appearance of which embarrassed and alarmed the UN in 
1967.132  Even when UN forces had relevant information, it could not be properly 
analyzed and employed.  Peacekeepers observed unusual movements of Greek army and 
National Guard officers in Cyprus prior to their 1974 coup in Nicosia.  Since the UN 
lacked an effective reporting and analysis mechanism, no one attached any special 
relevance to this activity, causing surprise within UNFICYP and at UN headquarters.133 
Following the October 1973 Yom Kippur war between Israel and Egypt and 
Syria, the UN established UNEF II in the Sinai and UNDOF in the Golan Heights the 
same month.  Both missions patrolled border areas and, like the original UNEF, are 
essentially overt intelligence collection operations.  Covering the same territory of UNEF 
I, UNEF II in particular capitalized on infusions of technology to help monitor the border.  
Air reconnaissance again played its part.134  Canadian and Australian fixed-wing aircraft 
and helicopters patrolled the skies to fulfill a growing number of intelligence 
requirements (compared to UNEF I).135  US civilians installed and operated an electronic 
surveillance network to monitor passes through the Sinai.136  In addition to this “Sinai 
Field Mission,” UNEF II also benefited from nearly weekly American overflights of the 
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maintained control over its aircraft, Washington provided the aerial imagery to both 
Israel and Egypt.137  This proved instrumental in building confidence between the two 
countries.138 
During the Cold War, PKOs used ad hoc measures to fulfill intelligence 
requirements at the mission level.  The Middle East truce-monitoring missions (UNEF, 
UNEF II, and UNDOF) effectively operated with consent of the parties and all were at 
least moderately successful in containing violence.139  These missions incorporated overt 
intelligence collections ranging from on-the-ground patrols to air and technical 
surveillance.  UNFICYP, on the other hand, experienced the dramatic intelligence 
failures involving surprising large Greek army camps in 1967 and the 1974 coup.  
Despite these failures, the current calm on Cyprus suggests the mission has been at least 
partially successful.140  In the Congo, the UN eventually built a relatively robust 
intelligence organization which helped end the Katanga rebellion.  Future UN missions, 
especially in the intra-state conflicts of the 1990s, could have learned the value of good 
intelligence from ONUC, but the UN did not institutionalize any of the Congo mission’s 
lessons.   
The reasons for the UN’s PKO apparatus’ failure to learn are varied.  Large states, 
the permanent five of Security Council, in particular, may fear the loss of their monopoly 
on information flow to the organization.141  Because the Security Council was unlikely to 
act throughout the Cold War, the UN could afford to ignore intelligence at the 
headquarters in New York and rely on ad hoc measures in the field.142  This stagnation is 
evident in the dearth of Cold War peacekeeping missions—just 13 between 1945 and 
1988—most of which were designed and operated as observer missions.  The complex 
PKOs of the 1990s demanded more intelligence than the UN could deliver. 
 
137 Jones, “Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance II,” 4. 
138 Dino A. Brugioni, “The Effects of Aerial and Satellite Imagery on the 1973 Yom Kippur War,” Air 
Power History 51, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 12. 
139 Dombroski, 94. 
140 Diehl, 56. 
141 Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 442. 
142 Smith, 174. 
 33
                                                
C. THE 1990S 
The 1990s highlighted the need for intelligence in the UN, and saw the first 
serious (though unsuccessful) attempts to improve this capability.  The end of the Cold 
War standoff and the unwillingness of the superpowers to maintain proxy forces in the 
third world allowed the UN (and others) to take on a more assertive role.143  Encouraged 
by 1989 success of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which succeeded in 
helping Namibia transition to independent rule, and inspired by Secretary General 
Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, many saw UN missions as a panacea for 
calming post-Cold War violence.144  UN forces took on more state-building and peace-
building roles, moving away from former Secretary General Hammarskjöld’s 
peacekeeping principles.145  Somalia (UNOSOM I & II; April 1992-March 1995) and 
Bosnia (UNPROFOR; February 1992-December 1995) exemplify the UN field 
experience in the 1990s.  The Somalia and Bosnia missions were both conceived as 
humanitarian intervention missions, justified by the UN as combating “threat[s] to 
international peace and security.”146  Both resulted in high UN fatality figures—160 for 
the UNOSOM mission and 213 in UNPROFOR.147  These two missions made 1993, 
1994, and 1995 three of the five deadliest years in UN peacekeeping history, the other 
two resulting from Congo operations in 1961 and 2005.148   
The UN withdrew from Somalia and Bosnia having failed to fulfill its respective 
mandates.  Judged by the criteria of limiting armed conflict and conflict resolution, the 
UN failed in both countries.149  These failures overshadowed the UN’s contemporaneous 
 
143 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 16. 
144 Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” 12. 
145 O’Neill and Rees, 175. 
146 Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” 5. 
147 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type 
up to 30 April 2007,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/StatsByMissionIncidentType%204.pdf 
(accessed May 28, 2007). 
148 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Fatalities by Year up to 30 April 2007,” 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/StatsByYear%201.pdf (accessed May 28, 2007). 
149 Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” 19. 
 34
                                                
moderate successes like Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique.150  The 1990s also 
saw the creation of arms control and disarmament missions like the UN Angola 
Verification Missions (UNAVEM) and the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq 
after the 1991 Gulf War.  During this period the UN attempted to improve its 
management of peacekeeping missions, including the first attempts to bring an 
intelligence function to UN headquarters.  
UNOSOM and UNPROFOR found the UN embroiled in ongoing conflicts 
without the means to execute their ambiguous mandates.  Fortunately in these instances, 
the UN commissioned after-action reports in an attempt to capture lessons for the future.  
Of particular note are the intensely detailed history of the massacre at the UN-designated 
safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia151 and the UN’s report on Somalia.152 
1. Somalia 
From 1992 to 1995, the UN ran two operations in Somalia, UNOSOM I and II.  
The first mission was an ineffective 500-man operation, lasting from April 1992 to March 
1993.153  Because of its ambitious mandate and spectacular failure, most analysis of the 
UN in Somalia focuses on UNOSOM II, which ran from March 1993 to March 1995.  
This mission took over for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF, also called Operation 
Restore Hope) led by the United States.  After UNITAF’s withdrawal, the US contributed 
a 3,000-strong support force to provide logistics for the UN.  Other American combat 
forces—including a Quick Reaction Force battalion and an Intelligence Support Element 
(ISE) nominally dedicated to UNOSOM—operated outside the UN command 
structure.154  UNOSOM II was the first time the UN directly ran a peace enforcement 
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mission authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter.155  In contrast to previous 
PKOs authorized under Chapter VI, which are based on consent of the parties and limit 
the use of force to self-defense, Chapter VII missions are not consent based, and the 
peacekeeping force may “all means necessary” to accomplish its mandate.  Since a peace 
enforcement operation is essentially “war by another name,” the intelligence 
requirements are significantly higher than in a traditional cease-fire monitoring 
mission.156  The UN’s own after action report singled out intelligence issues as a key 
problem area.157 
When UNOSOM II deployed in 1993, it did not have a full picture of the situation 
on the ground.  The post-mortem identified the need for better pre-deployment 
assessments on the nature of the conflict.  Further, the UN realized this information was 
available from academics, non-governmental organizations, and other sources, but that 
the UN itself had made no attempt to assimilate and analyze any of this data.158 
The UN did not necessarily trust the U.S. intelligence community in Somalia, 
partly because of its corporate aversion to military intelligence but also because it wanted 
to avoid the perception of being Washington’s tool.159  On the ground though, the 
UNOSOM II commander had to rely on the imperfect relationship with American 
intelligence.160  The UN lacked its own intelligence structure, and so America provided 
much of the “hard intelligence” the UN used in planning raids on arms caches and other 
operations.161  This task was difficult, however, because the American ISE did not trust 
the UN’s information security.  Afraid to compromise its sources to lax UN procedures, 
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the ISE faced difficulty sharing classified information.162  This lack of coordination 
affected the independent U.S. forces as well; U.S. Army Rangers raided a UN office in 
July 1993 believing it to be a hideout for Mohammad Aideed.163   
UNOSOM II’s state-building mandate caused it to aspire to neutrality at its outset 
in an attempt to bring all the Somali factions to the negotiating table.  Faced with 
obstruction just two months into the process, the UN declared Mohammad Aideed and 
his militia as a target in June 1993, costing the UN force any pretence of neutrality.164  
Now effectively a belligerent in the conflict, the UN could not use impartiality as a 
reason not to pursue an independent intelligence strategy.165  UNOSOM II undertook 
some intelligence activities; including paying for information,166 but there is no data to 
assess the efficacy of this collection effort.  The UN found that it needed to enter peace 
enforcement missions with a plan for collecting and analyzing intelligence.167  Though 
UNOSOM II “was an object lesson in UN inadequacies,”168 evidence from the 1999 
Congo mission (detailed in Chapter III) shows that the UN did not internalize this lesson.  
At the same time, the UN also failed to learn from the disastrous UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.   
2. Bosnia 
The UN began its UNPROFOR mission in February 1992 with a humanitarian 
mandate in Croatia.  The Security Council quickly expanded the mission to Bosnia, and 
by 1993 assigned UNPROFOR the task of protecting designated “safe areas” from 
hostilities.169  While the UN found some success in providing aid to needy 
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communities,170 it failed in its mission to shield these zones from violence—up to 20,000 
civilians, mostly Bosnian Muslim, died “in and around the safe areas.”171  In July 1995 at 
the “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb Army held 48 Dutch 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers hostage while it “terrorized” the 30,000 Bosnian Muslim 
residents.172  Bosnian Serbs killed between 6,000 and 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and 
boys.173  The Dutch Battalion (Dutchbat) knew the Bosnian Serbs surrounded the safe 
area, but lacked good intelligence on Serb objectives.  In fact, military intelligence was 
“an endemic weakness throughout the conflict.”174  There was no established mechanism 
for NATO or other UN member states to deliver intelligence to UN headquarters or 
UNPROFOR, let alone to field units.  If any of these producers had information on an 
impending Bosnian Serb attack, it did not reach the UN.175  The Secretary-General 
identified this procedural failing, along with the lack of a UN intelligence capability, as a 
“major operational constraint.”176 
The UN leadership knew intelligence was an issue even before Srebrenica,177 but 
took no significant steps to rectify the situation.  Battalions in the field were on their own.  
Some UNPROFOR troop contributing countries took basic intelligence gathering into 
their own hands, without UN authorization.178  The extent of Dutch intelligence  
 
 
170 William J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” in 
Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, 252. 
171 United Nations, “The Fall of Srebrenica,” 6. 
172 The Economist, “Black-and-blue Helmets,” The Economist 336, no. 7923 (July 15, 1995): 11. 
173 Richard H. Curtiss, “Bosnia Ten Years Later,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 24, 
no. 7 (September/October 2005): 44.  Curtiss says 6,000-7,000 were killed.  Other estimates range from 
7,500 to 8,000.  See Haroon Ashraf, “Srebrenica Tragedy Forces Dutch Government to Resign,” The 
Lancet 359, no. 9315:1409.  The official UN report on Srebrenica declines to state the total, though when it 
was published in 1999 it acknowledged 2,500 bodies had been found, and thousands of men and boys were 
still missing.  See United Nations, “The Fall of Srebrenica,” 102. 
174 Roel Janssen, “Dutchbat in Srebrenica,” Europe 352 (December 1995/January 1996): 103. 
175 Janssen, 62. 
176 Ibid., 119. 
177 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 982 
(1995) and 987 (1995),” UN Document S/1995/444, 1995, 18. 
178 A. Walter Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 429. 
 38
ctures.184 
                                                
collection effort is not documented; what is certain is that Dutchbat and the UN did not 
realize the full extent of Bosnian Serb intentions regarding the Bosnian Muslims in 
Srebrenica.179 
Srebrenica is but one manifestation of intelligence failure in Bosnia, and was 
symptomatic of larger issues.  The UNPROFOR headquarters and structure also bears 
some of the blame for deficiencies in information flow, military intelligence, and 
command and control.  News of the initial Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica did not 
arrive at UN Headquarters until the next day, and Dutchbat requests for immediate 
reinforcement did not reach the UN’s Balkan headquarters in Sarajevo.180  Key UN 
leaders did not know about the gravity of the situation until three days after the attack 
began.181  This communication breakdown prevented mere consideration of solutions, 
though given the UN’s lackluster response, a timely communication system may not have 
helped defuse the situation.  Even perfect intelligence cannot guarantee an appropriate 
policy or military response. 
As in Somalia, the UN in Bosnia faced a task it was not equipped to handle.  At 
its largest troop level in November 1995, UNPROFOR had only 23,630 “blue helmet” 
peacekeepers.182  It is telling that the follow-on NATO Implementation Force had over 
60,000 heavily armed troops183 with more robust rules of engagement and full 
integration into the NATO command, control, and intelligence stru
3. Other 1990s Operations 
In Angola, the UN carried out a series of three verification and one observation 
mission (UNAVEM I, II, III, and MONUA—the United Nations Observer Mission in 
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Angola) from January 1989-February 1999 intended to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from the country and to assist in post-civil war demobilization and disarmament 
efforts.  While UNAVEM I succeeded in facilitating the Cubans’ departure,185 ultimately 
the country fell back into violence.186  UNAVEM II and III and MONUA had to cover 
too much territory with their limited resources—initially “just 450 military observers for 
an area the size of Germany, France and Spain put together.”187  Lack of an intelligence 
capability kept the mission from focusing its limited resources, precluding arms cache 
discovery.188  To be fair, these missions were designed to oversee internal 
implementation of peace agreements, not to direct a comprehensive disarmament effort—
“UNAVEM’s role was therefore to ensure that … the other monitoring groups did their 
job.”189  Conversely, since the missions were not designed to be omnipresent throughout 
the country, they needed intelligence all the more to direct their efforts. 
A more intense and intrusive UN intelligence collection effort—the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM)—focused on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction disarmament in 
the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.  Though not a peacekeeping mission, it was the most 
intrusive information gathering operation in UN history.  UNSCOM’s mandate allowed it 
to interrogate Iraqi officials, perform intrusive, unannounced site inspections, and use its 
own aircraft to patrol anywhere in the country.190  The mission incorporated personal on-
site inspections with high-tech collection including signals intelligence, and electronic 
surveillance.191  UNSCOM also enjoyed a close working relationship with U.S. and 
British intelligence.  It was the first instance of the UN assuming operational control over 
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an American U-2 high altitude spy plane.192  The UN used this intelligence to find 
potential weapons sites.193  In addition, many of the technical weapon systems experts 
came from western countries.  This politically disadvantaged the mission, as some 
smaller states resented the dependence.194 Allegations of Central Intelligence Agency 
infiltration of UNSCOM did not help the UN cause, nor did data sharing with Israel.195  
Though UN field missions need an intelligence capability, they must be careful to 
conduct their collection operations aboveboard. 
4. Reform Attempts 
The UN began to adapt its structure to the changing reality of peacekeeping in the 
1990s.  In 1991, only a couple of dozen staff officers at UN headquarters focused on 
peacekeeping;196 later in the 1990s this grew to approximately 50.197  The UN did not 
have a permanent organization for administering PKOs until the 1992 creation of the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).198  Kofi Annan became the first head 
Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, a role he filled until he became Secretary 
General in 1997.199  The new DPKO was not capable of providing real-time command 
and control to the various missions, since UN Headquarters was in communication with 
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deficiency was somewhat rectified in 1993 with the establishment of a 24-hour “Situation 
Centre.”  With only two people on duty at any given time, the “SitCen” was not 
completely effective.201   
That the SitCen continues to exist today is tacit acknowledgement of the 
importance of information flow.  The UN still does not task the Centre with actual 
intelligence production.202  Despite an “information gathering” mission, the SitCen has 
no analysis function, though it does monitor the media and attempts to track activity in 
UN missions around the world.  Information gathering, as described on the SitCen 
website, is more akin to collating media reports.203  However necessary this may be, it 
cannot be said to equal intelligence production.   
After the failures in Somalia and Bosnia, member states recognized the need to 
improve UN management of peacekeeping operations.  Several countries seconded 
military officers to DPKO in an effort to set up a professional PKO staff.  By 1997, 111 
"gratis" officers worked at DPKO; their home countries continued to pay their salaries.204  
Seconded officers from France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States formed 
an “Information and Research Unit” (I&R) with ties back to their home intelligence 
communities. 205  For instance, the U.S. officer was on loan from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency; Washington used this officer as a conduit for delivering “sanitized” 
intelligence to the UN.  Although I&R was not an independent UN analysis arm, the 
officers counterbalanced each others’ national biases in their assessments.206   
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Although UN officials such as then-Undersecretary General Kofi Annan valued 
I&R reporting,207 the developing countries of the Non-alignment Movement resented the 
preponderance of rich-country officers on the staff.  In June 1997, these states began to 
push for the removal of the gratis officers.  In September 1997, General Assembly 
Resolution 51/243 called for replacement of these officers with an international civilian 
staff.208  Such an arrangement would guarantee decreased western participation, since 
geographic quotas regulate the international civilian bureaucracy.  A series of political 
compromises followed.  The net result was the February 1999 elimination of the final 
gratis officer positions.  Despite the loss of these 111 officers, the UN had no plan to 
replace their expertise.  This set DPKO back several years.209 
D. CONCLUSION 
Just as UN peacekeeping operations began as an ad hoc measure, so too did its 
intelligence capability.  Field mission commanders quickly realized that they needed 
military intelligence to execute their mandates, and in fact the early PKOs (with the 
notable exception of ONUC) were essentially large intelligence-gathering operations.  
The overt nature of truce supervision backed by the consent of all parties enabled the UN 
to pursue its goals without institutionalizing intelligence practices.  When the UN found 
itself fighting a war in the Congo, the organization was unprepared.  Ad hoc measures 
within the mission contributed to the end of the Katanga rebellion.  Unfortunately the UN 
did not learn from this experience, nor did it institutionalize its fledgling intelligence 
capabilities. 
The end of the Cold War allowed the UN Security Council to build a consensus 
for intervention.210  The intrastate conflicts of the 1990s pulled UN peacekeepers into a 
chaotic environment more akin to situation facing ONUC in the Congo than the 
traditional PKOs on which the organization had built its reputation.  Operational failures 
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in Bosnia and Somalia forced the UN to relearn the lessons of the Congo.  New York 
began to learn from the field, and attempted to professionalize the management of PKOs, 
including development of a small analysis cell.  Politics proved to be the undoing of its 
existence and the smaller states eliminated the embryonic institutional intelligence 
capacity at the headquarters. 
Twentieth century PKOs set many precedents for UN use of intelligence at the 
headquarters and in the field.  Unfortunately, the organization found itself relearning the 
same lessons with each operation.  In the 1990s, the UN did not adapt its intelligence 
practices to meet the demands of complex peacekeeping, allowing missions to fail.  
Faced with this reality, a 2000 UN-commissioned study called for improvements to 
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III. THE BRAHIMI REPORT AND BEYOND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations emerged from the 1990s with its nose bloodied from failed 
interventions in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda, along with less-than-stellar records in 
Angola and Haiti.  In 1999, the UN found itself entering complex missions in Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.211  UN peace operations 
in the 1990s “repeatedly failed to meet the challenge” of preventing war and bringing 
peace.212 
To address the UN’s systemic post-Cold War failures, UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan commissioned Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi to chair a panel to 
review UN peacekeeping operations (PKO).  After months of study, the Report of the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, was issued on August 21, 2000 and quickly 
became known as the Brahimi Report.  The significance of the report bears reiteration of 
its key findings.  Notably, Foreign Minister Brahimi and his panel recommended 
improvements to UN intelligence at the tactical, operation, and strategic levels.  The 
report recognizes that operationally and tactically, enhanced intelligence advances cease-
fire monitoring, peace enforcement, and force protection.213  To support strategic 
decision-making, the panel recommended creating the EISAS (Executive Committee on 
Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategy Analysis Secretariat) 
organization.214  Even though EISAS failed for political reasons,215 the report has proved 
influential.  UN operations since the Brahimi Report’s publication have made some 
improvements to their intelligence functions, but not without experiencing significant 
growing pains. 
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B. POST-BRAHIMI REPORT FAILURES 
While the UN did not fully embrace the Brahimi Report’s recommendations, field 
experience continued to highlight the need for improved intelligence in the UN system.  
A full case study of the 18 ongoing UN operations is beyond the scope of this study, but 
the UN created the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU)216 of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the aftermath of the Brahimi report to fuse lessons 
learned and policy analysis.217  Since its founding in 2001, PBPU has performed studies 
and commissioned outside institutions to develop analyses of missions and procedures.  
Only a few missions have received in-depth treatment from PBPU on their military 
components and specifically the role of intelligence, but these studies show that the 
problem of insufficient intelligence continues to plague UN missions.218  Several 
examples from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels will suffice to demonstrate 
the point.  
Politically, the run-up to the Iraq war highlighted the UN’s reliance on member 
state-provided intelligence.  The United States shared intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of 
Mass Destruction program.  From the UN point of view, the issue is not so much that the 
United States chose to share intelligence, but that it shared intelligence to pursue a 
national objective rather than for the general advancement of the UN.219  The 1990s-
vintage Intelligence and Research Unit, described in Chapter II, showed that the UN 
could produce relatively unbiased reports for the UN leadership.  Though not perfect, a 
revitalized UN analysis capability could free the organization (to some degree) from 
national agendas.220  Despite Foreign Minister Brahimi’s push for EISAS, member states 
have so far rejected this solution.   
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Strategic pre-deployment briefings for peacekeeping missions’ senior leadership 
are weak.  They tend to focus on administrative and bureaucratic matters to the detriment 
of information about the history, culture, and context of the conflict.  Lessons learned 
reports from the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000-present) and the UN 
Mission to Burundi (ONUB, 2004-2006) both highlighted this point.221  Although the 
Brahimi report identified the importance of pre-deployment briefings,222 this lesson was 
not fully institutionalized prior to ONUB’s 2004 deployment, four years after the Brahimi 
Report’s publication.  Only two missions have deployed since ONUB;223 no information 
on their pre-deployment briefings was available. 
A strategic intelligence failure was manifest in ONUB.  The inability of the 
mission to turn raw data into political intelligence prevented the UN from forecasting 
election results.224  The operation suffered following the later 2005 inauguration of the 
new government.225  Though better intelligence could not have changed the election 
results, it could have allowed the mission to better prepare itself for dealing with a hostile 
host government.226   
UNMEE deployed shortly after the Brahimi Report’s release.  PBPU made public 
a 2003 lessons learned report and a 2004 follow-up document.  UNMEE, the first 
operational test of Brahimi’s recommendations succeeded in some regards, notably in 
humanitarian Quick Impact Projects,227 but improved intelligence was nowhere to be 
found.  In the words of Dutch Major General Patrick Cammaert, the first UNMEE Force 
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Commander, “We were blind in UNMEE.”228  UNMEE lacked adequate intelligence on 
Ethiopian and Eritrean front lines and troop deployments; the lessons learned report states 
that UN headquarters should have given this information to the mission during the start-
up phase.229 
UNMEE peacekeepers did not have the maps they needed to get around the area 
of operations.  The Netherlands-Canada battalion (NECBAT) created its own maps and 
the other contingents had to rely on their own resources.230  The author, an UNMEE 
military observer in 2001, recalls using a borrowed copy of the NECBAT map along with 
1940s-vintage Russian maps, neither of which were wholly adequate for patrol planning 
or military analysis.  Fortunately for peacekeepers on the ground, the UN took this lesson 
to heart.  Geographic information cells were included in the 2004 startup of missions to 
Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti.231 
In a peace operation, every peacekeeper is a potential intelligence collector.232  
With easy access to the conflict area and extensive interaction with the local population, 
peacekeepers are well positioned to gather intelligence about troop movements and cross-
border or inter-group incidents.  Unfortunately there is no guidance from the UN to troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) on how to conduct investigations.  In UNMEE, this 
resulted in several incidents not receiving satisfactory resolution.233  In response to this 
finding, in 2004, Force Commander, British Major General Robert Gordon, issued 
guidance on investigations.234  The lack of regulation or direction from UN headquarters 
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suggests that there is room for development of standardized doctrine.  In fact, PBPU 
commissioned a scoping project on peace operations doctrine in early 2006.235   
UNMEE faced difficulty tracking the movement of illegal weapons into the 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) between Eritrea and Ethiopia.  There was no baseline 
information on the legal deployments of police, militia, and their weapons, so there was 
no way for peacekeepers to measure changes.236  Part of the solution is the political 
matter of establishing a mechanism for weapon registration during the peace process.  
With the baseline determined, in-mission intelligence can track these weapons.  When 
peacekeepers inventory a cache, they can then determine if these stockpiles are 
legitimately registered.  Weapons found in rebel hands can be cross-referenced to the 
baseline to determine if they came from declared stocks; this may point to the weapons’ 
origin.  Peacekeepers can declare unregistered weapons illegitimate and seize them. 
A dearth of intelligence on small arms and light weapons (SALW) also hinders 
the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process many peace 
operations undertake.237  Joanna Spear, a political scientist, explicitly blames the UN’s 
lack of intelligence and analysis for the failure of many DDR operations:  “UN-led 
missions are crippled from the start in their attempts to robustly confront cheating.”238  
For example, as part of its 2004 DDR program, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had 
collected only about one gun for every four militia members.239  Clearly this is 
inadequate for success.  Improved intelligence would allow focused targeting of the 
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missing arms, either through direct military action or increased incentives for particular 
types of weaponry.  Further, improved SALW intelligence would help determine if new 
arms were arriving in the conflict area. 
MONUC—the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—
reinforces this point.  Major General Cammaert commanded the 15,000 UN peacekeepers 
in Eastern DRC from February 2005 through February 2007.  He said the many militias 
in the region, coupled with a flow of weapons from Uganda and Rwanda, proved difficult 
to track.  Though the UN asked MONUC TCCs to provide intelligence resources, no 
country volunteered.  The UN bureaucracy thwarted his attempt to contract for aerial 
reconnaissance since the companies with the requisite capability were not on the UN’s 
contracting list.240  Overall, the UN system has not institutionalized its intelligence 
practices, despite some improvements. 
In a world of transnational terrorism, force protection intelligence is an absolute 
necessity.  The UN sought to improve its security measures in the wake of the August 
2003 attack in Baghdad which killed the UN’s chief representative, Sergio Vieira de 
Mello.241  The attack, just nine days after the Security Council had established the UN’s 
presence in Iraq, also killed 14 other people, and injured dozens more.242  Following the 
bombing, the UN withdrew its personnel from Iraq; they slowly returned with increased 
security beginning in April 2004.243  Despite this renewed emphasis on UN force 
protection, the threat has not gone away.  In June 2007, a terrorist bomb targeted a UN 
patrol, killing six peacekeepers in Lebanon.244  The UN’s post-attack rhetoric has  
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demonstrated resolve,245 but resources must follow to counter the undiminished threat.  
Improving force protection is a vital, but difficult, task.  Potential TCCs must know the 
UN will safeguard their troops. 
C. POST-BRAHIMI REPORT SUCCESSES 
Denied a formal intelligence analysis capability, the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) built up informal contacts with member state 
militaries.  In some cases, the UN formalized this connection effort—for instance, the 
organization created a liaison officer post at NATO headquarters.246  In most cases, 
however, intelligence innovation is an ad hoc process within each mission. 
In May 2003, the UN authorized an International Emergency Multinational Force 
(IEMF—not a UN blue helmet operation) to complement MONUC’s efforts at 
humanitarian security in Eastern DRC.  France was the lead nation for IEMF and 
provided signals intelligence and imagery intelligence, along with special operations 
forces for reconnaissance.247  A PBPU after-action report on IEMF concluded that this 
intelligence was critical to the IEMF’s success.248  Although the IEMF deployment 
lasted only three months, MONUC was able to apply some of the intelligence lessons 
learned from the short m
Subsequently, MONUC increased its own intelligence efforts.  The UN Security 
Council, in a series of resolutions, expanded the number of authorized peacekeepers from 
8,700 in December 2002 to over 16,000 by December 2006. 249  The obvious benefit was 
to increase the number of UN eyes on the ground.  As part of this increase, MONUC 
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gained a Guatemalan special operations company—the first deployment of special forces 
with the UN.  These troops perform reconnaissance and counter-smuggling missions.250   
Maj Gen Cammaert also had some success in developing sources and informants 
among the local population.  In his characterization, the Congolese are willing to provide 
information for a fee.  The UN system is not set up to handle this sort of expense, so he 
took “creative measures,” using existing UN protocols for hiring local staff to build up 
his information gathering capability.  The mission’s civilian financial bureaucracy 
resisted his initiative at first, but ultimately found a way to accommodate it.251 
In addition to this human intelligence capability, MONUC has employed a small 
signals intelligence and imagery capability donated by member states like The 
Netherlands.252  This intelligence network has improved MONUC’s ability in the field, 
but politics will probably prevent it from becoming institutionalized in the wider system.  
Despite the ad hoc nature of tactical intelligence, the UN has made a significant stride 
forward in its information analysis capability at the mission level, and is working to 
standardize the practice throughout its field operations. 
This innovation is the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC).  As the Military 
Advisor to the Secretary General, Maj Gen Cammaert pushed the idea of a JMAC “as a 
central location for information to be received, analyzed, evaluated, and appropriately 
disseminated.”253  JMACs report to a mission’s top leader, the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General (SRSG), and provide the SRSG with consolidated political and 
military reporting.   
In late 2003, the UN’s Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 
briefly described the JMAC’s purpose: “The JMAC is responsible for the management 
(collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the 
mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force 
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commander’s decision-making process.”254  The handbook did not provide any further 
details on composition or procedures, leaving implementation to the individual missions. 
The UN started to form JMACs by 2005, with trial versions underway in ONUB 
(Burundi) and MONUC.  Because JMACs report to civilian SRSGs, civilian analysts lead 
them, although they may have a substantial military component.255  Thus, the JMAC is 
not a military intelligence cell, but instead integrates the full spectrum of information.  
JMAC tasks, as outlined in a UN policy document, are shown in Figure 3.  
 
a. Provide relevant and timely analysis to the SRSG, Senior Management Group and 
heads of office, components and agencies within a mission to allow informed 
decision-making. 
b. In conjunction with a SIOC [security information and operations cell], monitor and 
provide early warning of developments of threats. 
c. Establish a focal point for all information 
d. Collect information and create a database to ensure continuity. 
e. Provide short term and longer term assessments of events and developments in 
response to tasking and requests from the SRSG and other mission components. 
f. Provide input into threat and risk analysis and advice on the mitigation of risk in close 
coordination with the security component. 
g. Produce integrated written and verbal evaluations and distribute these as appropriate. 
h. Liaise with neighbouring missions to ensure the coordination and sharing of relevant 
information. 
i. Coordinate meetings and working groups to encourage the input of information of all 
mission components, offices, agencies and programmes to ensure a comprehensive 
security assessment as possible. 
j. Integrate specific threat estimates and analysis produced by the SIOC. 
Figure 3. JMAC Tasks 256 
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ice. 
These JMAC tasks deserve explanation.  The UN JMAC policy paper recognized 
that “intelligence capability is a priority for effectiveness of UN missions.”257  This 
directly addresses the Brahimi report recommendation that fielded forces receive an 
intelligence capability.  The JMAC, however, is specifically designed not to be a military 
intelligence cell.258  Although it works in conjunction with the peacekeeping force’s 
Joint Operations Center, it has an independent vo
Importantly, the JMAC will develop priority information requirements that drive 
reporting and analysis throughout the mission.259  This includes both the military force 
and civilian UN entities such as the civilian police and human rights organizations.  The 
JMAC collates and evaluates all this information to build its assessments for the SRSG.  
The UN’s depiction of this information flow is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. JMAC Information Flow.260 
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The JMAC is designed to be flexible, and may change over time.  For instance, 
civilian police representatives may be absent at the outset of a mission but be integrated 
later.  Conversely, the Humanitarian Assistance portion of a mission may be phased out 
as the situation becomes more stable and refugees return to their homes.  This flexibility 
also extends to the JMAC’s functions.  The SRSG can tailor the JMAC to suit local 
conditions.  For example, the ONUB SRSG has added a requirement for daily reporting 
to the standard UN list.261   
The ONUB case is instructive because it was one of the first missions to create a 
JMAC.  The mission’s lessons learned report found JMAC implementation to be 
problematic.  The UN faced difficulty filling key JMAC positions; the ONUB JMAC was 
generally under strength.262   Direct commentary on the MONUC JMAC was 
unavailable, though the 2006-2007 MONUC budget document may be instructive.  While 
the MONUC JMAC began operations in 2005, the budget report speaks of the JMAC in a 
future tense: “The JMAC would be headed by a Senior Information Analyst… would be 
assisted by two Information Analysts.”263  This implies some key positions had either not 
been budgeted for at startup or had not yet been filled. 
Despite these difficulties, by early in 2006 JMACs were at work in six missions:  
MONUC and ONUB, along with Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan 
(UNMIS), and Haiti (MINUSTAH).264  These cells varied in size from two to 12 
personnel, depending on mission requirements.265  Within a year, the missions in 
Western Sahara (MINURSO), Lebanon (UNIFIL), and East Timor (UNMIT) established 
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their own JMACs.266  The MINURSO report particularly lauds the JMAC:  “Through its 
subsidiary units—the information collection cell and the information analysis cell—the 
joint mission analysis cell manages the collection, storage and analysis of data on issues 
of relevance to the implementation of the mandate of MINURSO.  The joint mission 
analysis cell has thus gradually developed into an effective instrument for the strategic 
management and decision-making of MINURSO.”267 
Still early in its development, the JMAC concept offers promise for the future.  In 
an enlightened turn of a phrase, the UN actually acknowledged the real purpose of the 
JMACs: “the joint mission analysis cell will be responsible for intelligence analysis.”268  
Finally, the UN has learned that “intelligence” is essential, not anathema to its mission.  
Underscoring the institutionalization of intelligence at the mission level, Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon in February 2007 proposed including a JMAC in any potential UN 
mission to Chad and the Central African Republic.269 
D. POST-BRAHIMI LESSONS LEARNED 
The UN has only slowly institutionalized intelligence.  The JMAC concept shows 
potential, at least for analysis work within a mission, but is not without its problems.  
ONUB demonstrated the difficulty of filling JMAC civilian leadership positions.270  In 
practice, military staff will probably dominate the JMAC at its establishment due to the 
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control to properly fulfill its political-military analysis function.272  This calls for 
establishment of a robust doctrine to guide the establishment and standard operating 
procedures of an intelligence cell.  Well-developed processes would help keep the cell 
focused on its overarching mission even if most of the manpower came from the 
mission’s military component.  
In contrast to the improving mission-level JMAC intelligence function, UN 
strategic political analysis has long been deficient.  The missions need detailed 
operational and tactical intelligence to carry out their mandates, while the Security 
Council needs wide-ranging political and strategic intelligence to design appropriate 
missions.  Resource shortfalls brought on by inappropriately designed mandates can lead 
to disaster. 
The Rwanda experience in particular demonstrated the need for a strong mandate 
to prevent mission failure.  The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) had 
intelligence about the impending genocide and even provided a warning to UN 
headquarters.273  UN headquarters dismissed the warning and insisted that disarming the 
interhamwe militia was beyond the mission’s mandate.274  Appropriate intelligence 
during the mission design phase—prior to UNAMIR’s initial deployment--could have 
resulted in a stronger mandate from the outset, empowering the mission to take action 
against the interhamwe. 275  This information was available and either ignored or 
overlooked—the Rwandan media was a key player in raising tensions.276  If the UN had 
been listening to the radio before sending in the troops, the mission might have been 
designed to counter the threat of genocide.  Though the Brahimi Report was in part a 
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reaction to UNAMIR’s failure, this key fault still needs attention; Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT), as described in the next chapter, can fill the void. 
The UN does not have procedures for its headquarters-level intelligence function 
nor does it possess an institutionalized capacity to evaluate information.  As Graham and 
Kiras put it, “Information is continually flowing into UN Headquarters … It is the 
refining and analysis of such information that the UN lacks.”277  The Brahimi report’s 
recommendation for the EISAS analytical organization, though ignored, attempted to 
address this problem, and the ongoing JMAC effort does little to fix the problems at UN 
headquarters.  A strategic intelligence doctrine and the capability to acquire and analyze 
OSINT could help the UN improve in this area.  
Due to the wide range of UN activities, a potential intelligence capability would 
likely need to extend beyond the political realm.  To counter UNMEE’s issues of 
deploying troops “in the blind,”278 a new mission needs a solid baseline military order of 
battle.  Since the mission needs this information in the planning stage, a JMAC is not 
capable of creating this product—the JMAC has not been formed at this phase.  Small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) intelligence complements the overall military order of 
battle.  Recall how a lack of SALW information hindered the demobilization, 
disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs in UNMIL and MONUC.  The mission 
and UN headquarters could share responsibility for SALW information.  Headquarters 
would provide the mission with a baseline of SALW data; the mission should keep it 
updated with new intelligence.  As Chapter IV shows, solutions to these problems are 
available without reliance on member state intelligence organizations. 
Hand-in-hand with the need for order of battle intelligence goes the requirement 
for up-to-date maps of the mission area.  The UN partially addressed this deficiency with 
the establishment of geographic information cells in UNOCI and MINUSTAH from the 
start-up phase.279  The UN could explore further institutionalization of this practice as the 
 
277 Cameron Graham and James D. Kiras, “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: Definitions and 
Limitations,” Peacekeeping and International Relations 24, no. 6 (November 1995): 3.  
278 Cammaert interview. 
279 “United Nations, “UNMEE Lessons Learned Interim Report Updated Version,” 35. 
 59
                                                
organization’s peacekeeping doctrine develops.  Commercially available imagery—an 
open source—can aid in map building and also have a further utility in military order of 
battle construction. 
Previous attempts at intelligence reform failed in large part due to political 
conflict.  The UN will likely face difficulty developing an intelligence doctrine or 
structure without taking into account the politicized nature of the institution.  Before the 
Brahimi Report, a small “Information and Research Unit” staffed by officers seconded 
from member states performed an intelligence-like function.280  As explained in Chapter 
II, this branch disappeared when a 1999 UN General Assembly resolution sent the 
officers home without a plan to replace their expertise.281  Similarly, Chesterman 
describes how the Brahimi Report’s EISAS also failed because member states, fearing 
violations of their sovereignty, did not want their internal affairs to be the focus of a UN 
collection effort.282 
The successful institutionalization of JMACs is due in part to the proven need for 
operational intelligence, and also an acceptance on the part of member states that a 
mission-level JMAC does not threaten sovereignty.  JMAC operations focus on the 
mission area, and begin only after the mission is in place.  This gives the JMAC 
legitimacy within its area of operations and also limits its efforts to an authorized 
mission.  This means that other states need not fear a JMAC “spying” on them—the 
JMAC’s role is constrained.  The sovereignty question is the key obstacle to overcome in 
the quest to improve the overall ability of the UN to perform intelligence functions in 
support of peace operations.  Furthermore, a demonstrably strengthened intelligence 
capability may make it easier for the UN to obtain troop contributions.  Intelligence 
provides the underpinnings of force protection, which is a key factor in military 
deployment decisions, especially among casualty-averse Western states.  As governments 
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become more convinced that the UN can protect their citizens in the field, they will be 
more likely, all else being equal, to volunteer battalions for peace keeping duty. 
E. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
An important first step in the institutionalization of peace operation intelligence is 
the formalization of procedures through establishment of some form of doctrine.  The 
UN’s JMAC policy paper is a potential part of intelligence doctrine, but it is limited in 
scope.  Currently, the UN lacks a formal definition of the roles, missions, and processes it 
would expect from any UN intelligence organization.  That is, there is no existing UN 
intelligence doctrine.  A peacekeeping intelligence conference at Carleton University in 
Ottawa addressed this issue in 2003.  One panel developed four elements that should be 
included in any UN intelligence doctrine: ethics; accountability; disarmament and post-
conflict security; and resources and training.   
Regarding the ethical questions surrounding intelligence, the panel came to the 
consensus that the UN must establish that intelligence does not equate to spying.  Instead, 
the panel felt intelligence should be portrayed as a tool to protect peacekeepers, non-
governmental organizations, and civilians from attack and to fulfill humanitarian 
mandates; most of the information is available openly in any case.283  Viewed in this 
context, UN intelligence can be seen as a positive good rather than a necessary evil. 
The second doctrinal issue is accountability.  The conference panel concluded that 
ideally, a potential UN doctrine would allow for the conduct of an investigation in the 
event a mission fails due to faulty intelligence.284  At the same conference, Peter Kasurak 
said that UN doctrine must specify a chain of responsibility so that intelligence failures 
 
283 Rachel Lea Heide, Jaime Phillips, and Alexandre Dumulon-Perreault, “Peacekeeping Intelligence: 
New Players, Extended Boundaries 4-5 December 2003 Conference Report,” Centre for Security and 
Defence Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 2004, 
http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/doc/PKI_conference_report_2003.pdf (accessed February 9, 2007), 27; 
also Angela Gendron, “Ethical Issues: The Use of Intelligence in Peace Support Operations” (Presentation, 
Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, December 2003), 
http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/doc/Ethics%20of%20Intelligence%20and%20Peacekeeping.doc (accessed 
February 9, 2007). 
284 Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 28. 
 61
                                                
do not go unanswered.285  Accountability could apply at the strategic and mission level.  
The panel held that a UN intelligence doctrine must include a requirement to tell the 
organization what it “needs to hear and needs to know” to ensure the mission has the 
right mandate and strength.286  If poor intelligence led to a faulty mandate or insufficient 
resource allocation, the organization that provided the intelligence could be held 
accountable.  At the mission level, the JMAC could be doctrinally accountable if a 
tactical intelligence failure led to operational failure.   
The demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process and post-
conflict security also deserve mention in an intelligence doctrine.  As the peace operation 
yields to a civilian administration and police force, the panel said that the peacekeepers 
must be doctrinally directed to provide small arms and light weapons information to the 
new authorities. Such intelligence sharing is an argument against the secrecy and 
restrictive protocols associated with traditional intelligence.  The panel believed that poor 
sharing and a poor handoff to civil authorities would increase the risk of the conflict 
backsliding into violence.287  Regarding intelligence sharing, the conference panel also 
noted that NATO could offer an example for the UN.288  They did not, however, mention 
the NATO OSINT model this thesis describes in Chapter IV. 
The final doctrinal issue raised by the panel is resources and training.  According 
to the panel, UN doctrine should ensure that intelligence is planned into missions from 
the earliest stages.  This is an effort to provide sufficient resources for the mission’s 
intelligence functions from an operation’s inception.289  In addition to setting up an 
intelligence structure, the personnel who will do the actual collection, information fusion, 
and dissemination should have appropriate training for their tasks.  A presentation by 
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Robert Heibel at the conference said that UN intelligence training would range from 
basic computer skills to more refined analytic methods.290   
More than two years after the Ottawa conference, the Peacekeeping Best Practices 
Unit (PBPU) of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) commissioned 
a scoping study focused on mission start-up issues.291  The resulting study by the Peace 
Dividend Trust reviewed the existing, scattered guidance and found a lack of 
standardization and specificity.  With regard to intelligence, the study confirmed existing 
problems with political analysis.292  Because the study’s purpose was to describe the 
scope of the problem, it did not offer any prescriptions to fix peace operation intelligence. 
DPKO in conjunction with the Challenges Project undertook to develop an 
overarching doctrine for peacekeeping operations.  In September 2006, a draft of their 
capstone document appeared on the Challenges Project web site.  This high-level doctrine 
document incorporated the JMAC concept, stating a requirement that all peacekeeping 
missions include JMACs.293  Though it is impossible to determine a causal relationship, 
this inclusion satisfied the 2003 conference’s call for institutionalizing intelligence 
functions in all missions at the outset.  Since JMACs are inherently multi-disciplinary, 
encompassing military, civilian, and police functions, the capstone doctrine also allows 
for a clean handover of information to a post-operation civilian authority.  The draft was 
not specific about JMAC design.  This allows the mission needed flexibility, but more 
guidance is necessary.  DPKO partially filled the vacuum with its DPKO policy paper, 
described earlier in this thesis.  Since UN peacekeeping doctrine is still in draft form, 
many changes may still be made before the document is made official. 
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As the UN refines its intelligence processes, it is essentially developing an open-
source intelligence (OSINT) capability focused on peace operations.  According to 
operators such as Maj Gen Cammaert and academics like Chesterman and others, open 
sources can meet most of the UN’s intelligence requirements.294  OSINT can provide 
much of the historical, cultural, infrastructure, geographical, and political information 
necessary for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian assistance 
operations.295  The following chapter provides a brief introduction to OSINT and 
outlines the OSINT system developed in NATO d
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IV. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE NATO MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Possible low-cost solutions to the United Nations intelligence challenge already 
exist.  Since Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) can provide historical, cultural, 
infrastructure, geographical, and political information necessary for military operations, 
and is ready made for sharing, it can be explored as a possible UN capability.296  OSINT 
is by definition unclassified and fully sharable with all troop contributing countries and 
non-governmental organizations.  While a modern, high-tech military operation will 
require more than OSINT can deliver, perhaps 80 percent of all information on any given 
problem is available from open sources, and at relatively low cost.297  The UN could 
realize great gains from borrowing an available model for OSINT collection, analysis, 
and dissemination.   
Another international security institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), faced similar intelligence sharing issues during its post-Cold War complex 
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions of the 1990s.  Like the UN, NATO does 
not control its own intelligence assets and relies on member state intelligence 
contributions.298  As part of its response to meeting the challenge of timely and accurate 
information sharing, NATO developed a series of publications in 2001 and 2002 
outlining its end-to-end OSINT process and guidance for the establishment of standing 
OSINT analysis cells. 
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B. INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN NATO 
This section presents empirical data on existing intelligence structures in NATO.  
The parallels between NATO and the UN are evident, though NATO’s problems in this 
realm are magnified in the UN.  While member states in both organizations have long 
recognized the issue of intelligence sharing, progress over the years has been slow.  In a 
dynamic world threatened by transnational terrorism and ethnic conflict, intelligence 
sharing will only increase in importance. 
NATO began to institutionalize its intelligence sharing methods in the 1950s, as 
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) grew during the early Cold 
War.  SHAPE coordinated the member states’ military planning efforts,299 which 
required sharing of at least some intelligence data.  According to the official 2006 NATO 
Handbook, NATO strategic intelligence work is divided between SHAPE in Belgium and 
the Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia.300   
Since most of Europe’s (and North America’s) intelligence capability is 
centralized at the state level, NATO member states had to leverage their existing 
relationships with other states to obtain and share intelligence.301  The degree of NATO 
intelligence integration is less than the bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing 
relationships some individual states have established.  For instance, the link between the 
United States and British intelligence communities is much stronger than NATO’s 
intelligence sharing arrangement.  Faced primarily with the static threat of the USSR, for 
more than 40 years, NATO’s intelligence sharing proved adequate, if not prescient.  The 
1980s and 1990s emergence of the transnational terrorism threat provided an impetus for 
enhanced intelligence sharing within NATO, and the North Atlantic Council agreed to 
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improve information exchange.302  As a result, intelligence cooperation has been 
somewhat closer, especially since 9/11, but only to a degree; in reality, significant 
problems still exist.303 
NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement spotlights some of the intelligence sharing 
difficulties that have always existed.  NATO grew from 16 to 19 countries in 1999, and 
added seven more members in 2004.  Since the new states came primarily from the old 
Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Senate grew concerned about these countries’ security and 
counterintelligence programs.  A Senate committee report outlined fears that U.S.-
provided intelligence could be subject to unauthorized disclosure or penetration by 
hostile intelligence services.304  Different conceptions of privacy and different analytical 
paradigms make sharing data problematic within NATO.305 
The United States controls the preponderance of high-technology intelligence 
systems, and will likely retain this lead for the foreseeable future.306  This supports 
Keohane’s contention that certain states will possess an information advantage over their 
co-members in an international organization.  An intelligence gap can encourage free-
riding as small states take advantage of the information the United States must 
necessarily provide for the success of any NATO operation.307  This was most apparent 
during the 1999 Kosovo campaign.  NATO’s war demonstrated U.S. superiority in 
strategic lift, precision weaponry, and intelligence.308  In economic terms, a division of 
labor exploiting the U.S. comparative advantage in intelligence and high-technology 
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warfare and the European advantage in peacekeeping and low-intensity conflict may 
make sense.  Richard Aldrich asserts that this division could erode the political unity 
upon which the alliance is based.309  He does not provide any evidence, though he may 
be referring to divergent threat perceptions within the alliance undermining its common 
cause.  On the other hand, specialization and division of labor are important strategies for 
alliances in a unipolar world.310  In any case, NATO is taking steps to improve 
interoperability.311 
The alliance now operates a Situation Center at its headquarters in Brussels 
designed as a year-round intelligence clearinghouse.312  In 2005, NATO held a series of 
exercises aimed at testing intelligence interoperability.313  A sequel followed in 2006.314  
One of the successes was the adaptation of the Combined Enterprise Regional 
Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) computer network for secure information 
transfer among coalition partners.315  NATO has also created new institutions.  A NATO 
intelligence sharing center opened at Molesworth, UK in October, 2006,316 and an 
unprecedented Joint Intelligence Operations Center manned by officers from NATO, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan opened in Kabul on January 25, 2007.317  These intelligence 
sharing measures are in addition to the promise of OSINT. 
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The UN faces more problems in the intelligence sharing realm than NATO.  If 
NATO must contend with varying norms during enlargement, consider that the UN has 
192 member states as compared to NATO’s 26.  Inclusion of Partnership for Peace 
countries increases the number of governments dealing with NATO by 23, to a total of 
49.  If information asymmetry is so prominent inside the NATO alliance, consider the 
intra-UN difference between the United States’ intelligence capabilities and, for instance, 
Bangladesh’s—realizing that Bangladesh is second only to Pakistan in providing UN 
peacekeepers.318  This does not square with the UN’s need for effective intelligence in its 
peacekeeping operations.319 
C. WHAT IS OSINT? 
OSINT is a subset of publicly available information.  News reports, for instance, 
may feed OSINT, but are not OSINT by themselves.  Instead, OSINT is data analyzed 
and tailored for a specific audience and purpose.  For instance, a policymaker could 
request an analysis of media traffic or polling data in a particular country to support 
decision-making.  According to NATO, “OSINT is unclassified information that has been 
deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated to a select audience in 
order to address a specific question.”320   
The advent of the internet has multiplied the volume of available information, but 
the internet is not the only source of OSINT.  Traditional media sources are another part, 
along with overt human observation, commercially available imagery, internet sources 
(of varying quality), and importantly, so-called “grey literature.”  The latter category is 
comprised of working papers, informal publications, and unpublished reports—all 
available openly and legally, if not widely disseminated (i.e., the practitioner has no need 
for espionage, but must know where to find the information).321 
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The OSINT universe is a treasure trove of political, cultural, and historical 
information.322  Medical intelligence, essential for peacekeepers deployed to areas 
without reliable healthcare facilities, is accessible through open sources.  Even detailed 
geospatial information—maps, charts, terrain, vegetation, and hydrology—is available 
through open sources like GoogleEarth.323  In fact, commercially produced imagery is 
widely available at 1-meter resolution or better, good enough to identify key building, 
vehicles and radar, for instance.324  As Google’s John Hanke put it, “ten years ago, this 
technology was the exclusive province of the U.S. Intelligence Community.  Five years 
ago, it cost $14,000 for a single image.  Now there’s free, global high-resolution 
imagery.”325  The military intelligence value of GoogleEarth and other commercial 
products was reinforced by the U.S. Air Force’s Chief of Intelligence, Lieutenant General 
David Deptula.  Recognizing that the capability would not go away, he called it a 
“danger” and said, “It's something that was a closely guarded secret not that long ago and 
now everybody's got access to it.”326   
Stephen Mercado, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst, explained how OSINT 
proved its worth in World War II, and helped form the basis of intelligence assessments 
during the Cold War.  Openly broadcasts informed Allied assessments of Japanese 
shipbuilding efforts during the Pacific War.  The chief Far East analyst in the wartime 
U.S. Office of Strategic Services called open source information “indispensable.” 327  In 
the Cold War, OSINT “probably furnish[ed] the greater part of all information used in the 
production of military intelligence on the Soviet Union,” according to a declassified 1963 
article.  Likewise, open sources were “essential” in the Vietnam War to keep abreast of 
 
322 Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 3. 
323 James Fallows, “Spy’s Eye View,” Atlantic Monthly March, 2006, 140. 
324 NATO OSINT Handbook 10. 
325 Fallows, 142. 
326 Kristin Roberts, “U.S. general: Google Earth danger to security.  However, 'No one's going to undo 
commercial satellite imagery',” Reuters, June 21, 2007. 
 327 Stephen C. Mercado, “Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age,” Studies in Intelligence 
48, no. 3 (2004), https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3/article05.html (accessed February 14, 2007), 1. 
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developments from Hanoi.328  The advent of the information age has increased the 
amount of data publicly available.  Realizing OSINT’s potential, NATO developed a 
doctrine to guide the formal processing of this wealth of data.  This doctrine may be 
adopted by the UN with little effort or investment. 
D. THE NATO SYSTEM 
While NATO has dedicated resources within its international military staff to 
focus on intelligence,329 NATO owns no intelligence collection systems.  Instead, it must 
rely on the goodwill of member states to provide intelligence to the alliance.  States may 
fear compromising their sources and methods and seeing their secret capabilities 
revealed.  To fill information gaps, NATO has setup a system to leverage the wide range 
of available OSINT.  This section describes NATO’s OSINT architecture in general 
terms.   
The primary doctrinal publication is the 2001 NATO OSINT Handbook.  NATO 
also produced two companion volumes in 2002, the NATO OSINT Reader and NATO 
Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet.  The OSINT Reader is a compilation of articles 
on OSINT subjects ranging from the history of open source analysis to the future of 
commercial imagery.  The details of the NATO OSINT effort are beyond the scope of 
this study, though the book is an excellent resource for those interested in the topic.  The 
Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet document is a 100+ page guide to search 
methodologies and web site evaluation.  Though useful to the analyst culling information 
from the world-wide web, it is too far detailed for discussion here.  The essential point is 
that these three documents together are a starting point for an organization (e.g., the UN) 
seeking to develop its own OSINT capability. 
All of the various sources and combinations of open source material fall into four 
categories defined by NATO: 
 
 
328 Mercado, “Sailing the Sea of OSINT,” 2.  The referenced article is Davis W. Moore, “Open 
Sources on Soviet Military Affairs,” Studies in Intelligence, summer 1963. 
329 NATO Handbook 2006, 104. 
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• Open Source Data (OSD): raw information—photos, broadcasts, etc. 
• Open Source Information (OSIF): compiled and edited OSD—
newspapers, books, daily information summaries. 
• OSINT:  information processed and disseminated to answer a specific 
question 
• Validated OSINT (OSINT-V): OSINT considered to be very accurate330 
With an eye toward achieving operationally relevant OSINT-V, NATO applies the 
traditional intelligence cycle to OSINT:  planning and direction, collection, processing 
and exploitation, production, and dissemination.  A brief look at each of these areas is 
necessary to fully understand the distinction between raw unclassified data and the 
finished product that is OSINT. 
Planning and direction is essentially the requirements development process.  The 
commander must determine “precisely what they want to know, and why.”331  These 
information requirements allow the OSINT team to focus their collection and analytic 
efforts to meet that intent.  OSINT is more than just a summary of media stories; well-
defined requirements allow the analyst to hone to meet the exact needs of the commander 
and the mission.  In peacekeeping, this would include defining the geographical focus 
and time span under consideration, and posing particular questions about tribal, military, 
and economic factors important to the operation. 
Collection refers to the search for data.  The NATO doctrine holds that “knowing 
who knows” is the prime attribute of an OSINT team.332  More than just a Google search 
on the internet, a well-functioning OSINT cell will know the experts in the field of 
interest and have developed relationships with the “niche producers” who have focused 
time and resources on understanding particular issues.  In contrast to large information 
brokers with only superficial knowledge of a given topic, niche producers are small 
entities that concentrate on particular problem sets.  Because of their subject-matter 
 
330 NATO OSINT Handbook, 2. 
331 Ibid., 2, 16. 
332 Ibid., 19. 
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expertise, they can produce the best possible OSINT.333  In many cases these producers 
may be from universities, private-sector think tanks or other research institutions, or they 
may be individuals within NATO or government bureaucracies.   
Thus collected, the information must be processed and exploited.  This means 
ensuring source reliability, particularly for information found via the internet, and also 
recognition of outside source biases.  Irrelevant information should be discarded so that 
only the most salient data is included in the final analysis.334  Given the multiplicity of 
sources available, this can be a time consuming process. 
Production includes not just the writing of reports, but the further expansion of 
information through the establishment of expert forums.  This means making the research 
available for comment to the established authorities on the issue area.  While a 
commander may need a report in the short term, expert forums allow for continuing 
refinement of the newly produced OSINT.335 
The final step in the cycle is dissemination.  The best work of analysts is useless 
unless it reaches the target audience.  The first recipient should be the commander who 
requested the production, but OSINT’s nature allows it to be freely given to any other 
interested parties—for instance, coalition partners or even non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  For NATO, this means that all member states, and the 23 
Partnership for Peace countries, would be able to fully share and discuss the intelligence.  
This opens up additional space for intelligence fusion—each state is able to bring its own 
resources to bear in a free discussion of the topic under consideration. 
NATO’s end-to-end OSINT system ensures analytic value-added, rather than just 
a presentation of CNN clips to the commander.  Properly followed, it guarantees focused 
information sharable throughout the alliance, fulfilling the theoretical requirement and 
building trust among members.  Of course, OSINT cannot fully replace the production of 
all-source, classified intelligence, though many decisions, particularly at the political 
 
333 NATO OSINT Handbook, 10. 
334 Ibid., 23. 
335 Ibid, 29. 
level, do not require the technical detail that only specialized intelligence collectors can 
acquire.  Further, building the baseline from OSINT frees expensive and sensitive 
intelligence assets to be directed toward the specific hard targets for which they are most 
suited.  Since NATO owns none of these assets, the alliance can use its small intelligence 
staff to produce information of valuable to all members—and interested partners. 
E.   AN OSINT ORGANIZATION 
Former Central Intelligence Agency case officer and OSINT proponent Robert 
David Steele builds on the framework presented by NATO to outline a functional OSINT 
cell.  He envisions this small team as handling the immediate intelligence needs of a 
commander or other executive, while knowing the appropriate outside agencies to 
contract with for more detailed studies.336  His proposed cell includes at least six 
members, shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Proposed OSINT cell337 
 
                                                 




                                                
The requirements officer is responsible for ascertaining the commander’s intent 
and communicating it to the rest of the team.  The primary research specialist maintains a 
database of experts and contacts and knows who to contact to find detailed information.  
The wide body of media and reporting online is researched by the internet specialist and 
the commercial online specialist.  The difference is that the internet specialist sorts 
through the media and unofficial web content, while the commercial online specialist is 
expert in the use of wide-ranging tools such as Lexis/Nexis.  A contracting specialist is 
empowered to seek out niche producers with access to pertinent information and employ 
them to build specific products.  Finally, the team’s findings are packaged by a senior 
analyst for further dissemination.338 
F. PRACTICAL OSINT 
The American armed forces are no stranger to OSINT.  Of particular note are the 
unclassified, book length country reference guides produced by the Marine Corps 
Intelligence Activity.339  The studies fit in a uniform’s pocket for quick accessibility in 
the field.  These books are issued to U.S. officers embarking on United Nations Military 
Observer missions and are available throughout the Defense Department for general 
reference. 
High quality OSINT has been invaluable in contemporary military missions.  An 
open-source information clearinghouse called the Virtual Intelligence Center (VIC), 
established by the U.S. Pacific Command in 1999, produced an unclassified primer on 
East Timor that same year 1999.  This “one-stop” database was updated twice daily and 
distributed to multiple countries and non-governmental organizations.340  As an 
information resource, the primer was invaluable for both the information itself and its 
 
 338 Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 25-26.  Steele offers the chart but does not get into detail on 
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339 Donna O’Harren, “Opportunity Knocking: Open Source Intelligence for the War on Terrorism,” 
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340 Carl Otis Schuster, “Intelligence Support to Peacekeeping Operations” (Presentation, Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, December 2003), 
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accessibility.341  Partners shared a common information baseline and fed their own data 
back into the system to further refine the document.  The online nature of the VIC 
community and the database’s web-based interface meant it was available at any time to 
all of its users. 
NATO built a similar product prior to its operations in the former Yugoslavia.  
The staff compiled an open source 400-page guidebook to Yugoslav infrastructure, 
communications, and politics.  While the guidebook held a wealth of information, some 
military members dismissed the reference as irrelevant simply because it was not 
classified.  Once NATO officers added certain technical notes on military equipment, the 
entire document became classified and thus more palatable to its critics.342  The UN, of 
course, does not deal in classified information and therefore is likely to have no qualms 
about accepting a high-quality OSINT document.  OSINT is not a panacea for the UN’s 
intelligence woes, but establishing a structure is a necessary step in improving the 
timeliness and accuracy of information available to blue helmet peacekeepers. 
 
341 Schuster, 7-8. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A.  ADAPTING THE NATO MODEL 
Like NATO, the United Nations lacks access to any traditional intelligence 
collection systems.  In fact, the very diplomatic and open culture of the UN precludes 
consideration of acquiring such systems.  In many respects the NATO Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT) system resembles the EISAS analysis organization envisioned in 
the Brahimi Report.  Unlike that document, the NATO publications offer details for 
organization and continual refinement of intelligence.  The UN can take advantage of 
commercially available imagery, its own in-house specialists, and contract with 
established niche producers to produce focused OSINT. 
Commercial imagery has great promise for peace operations.  UN agencies from 
the World Food Program to the World Health Organization use satellite data regularly.343  
In 2003, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit studied the application of commercial 
satellite imagery to peace operations, and concluded that it could be a valuable resource 
for peace operations.344 
Although the UN cannot task any intelligence agency, it is certainly free to search 
available media and databases, and to deal with experts in fields of interest.  Many of 
these experts reside within the UN system or other international organizations such as the 
World Bank, the Red Cross or Crescent, Doctors without Borders, etc.  Although many 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) avoid information sharing to prevent 
accusations of bias, others are amenable to cooperation.  The UN has established a forum 
for NGOs and other parties to bring information to the Security Council on an ad hoc  
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basis.345  Other UN entities, such as the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
also have information networks that are available to the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO)346 
Having these specialists in close proximity yields another important 
consideration: the ease with which the UN can establish the expert forums envisioned by 
NATO.  Drawn together in the context of a particular peacekeeping mission, a cross-
functional working group fed by analysis generated in a UN OSINT cell would be an 
effective tool in assessing mission effectiveness.  
The UN can leverage niche producers to meet its needs.  For instance, the Small 
Arms Survey is a niche producer of SALW intelligence.  It can provide a baseline of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) inventories to a mission running a DDR 
program.347  Armed with this information, the mission can target specific types of 
weapons know to be in the country, and design appropriate price structures for buy-back 
programs based on actual weapons supplies.348  This would address the SALW tracking 
issues encountered by the UN in Ethiopia/Eritrea and Liberia.  
Dealing with these smaller firms may prove difficult for the UN with its 
Byzantine contracting system.  For instance, an attempt by the UN Mission in the Congo 
to contract a private company for aerial photography was stymied because the two 
companies with the required capability were not on the UN’s contracting list.349  The UN 
bureaucracy may not be responsive enough to deal with a large number of small 
companies.  It would be up to the Contracting Specialist on the OSINT team to make this 
system work efficiently. 
 
345 Ekpe, 379. 
346 Ekpe, 387. 
347 Eric G. Berman, “Surveying Small Arms: A View from the Field” (Presentation, Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, December 2003), 
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349 Cammaert interview. 
In addition, the NATO template is compatible with the UN’s Joint Mission 
Analysis Cell (JMAC) structure.  A notional JMAC organization as developed by the UN 
is shown in Figure 6.  According to the UN, each JMAC would be tailored to mission 
needs, so this exact composition may not apply in all cases.  The figure is potentially 
misleading—although the Information Management Cell (IMC) has more “boxes,” the 
Mid-Long Term Analysis Cell would receive the bulk of the JMAC’s manpower.350  It is 
this latter cell that could incorporate the OSINT team as drawn up in NATO’s doctrine 
and expanded on by Steele. 
 
 
Figure 6. JMAC Structure351 
                                                 
350 Otte interview. 
351 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Joint Mission Analysis Cell,” 5. 
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The functions of NATO’s internet specialists and experts in commercial online 
capabilities could augment civilian and military analysis within the Mid-Long Term 
Analysis Cell.  Editors, as described by NATO, are a natural complement to the JMAC 
administrative staff, and would provide quality control for the cell’s products.  The most 
difficult fit may be the Contracting Specialist position, since a UN mission’s purse strings 
are controlled by the Department of Administration and Management, not the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations.352  This need not derail the entire process, as the JMAC 
reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, who has control of all UN 
elements in the mission.  The SRSG can mandate the departments work together just as 
civilian and military analysts are united, and the JMAC IMC is collocated with the 
military’s Joint Operations Center. 
Adapting the NATO model to the UN appears feasible, at least from a technical 
point of view.  An OSINT cell can be small, and it need not have a huge budget, 
especially with so much information already resident within the UN system.  The issue is 
political will.  Member states are in a quandary, not wanting the UN to have anything 
approaching an “intelligence” function, but needing the UN to have the ability to analyze 
information for the sake of peacekeeping missions and to build trust in the organization 
among troop contributing countries.  The success of JMACs should help assuage small-
state fears that the UN will “spy” on them.  OSINT’s nature makes it different from the 
espionage member states fear, but it will take a concerted effort, led not just by Western 
powers, to actually implement meaningful change.  
B. UN INTELLIGENCE ISSUES 
1. Political 
On the political front, the success of JMACs in the field suggests that cooperation 
on intelligence issues, and trust in the UN to handle sensitive (though unclassified) 
operational data is a reality.  John Otte, a member of the UN’s peace operations doctrine 
working group, sees some progress toward institutionalization of intelligence at UN 
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headquarters.  UN peacekeeping doctrine is currently under development, but the fact that 
intelligence is on the agenda is a significant breakthrough.353  Great powers like the 
permanent five members of the Security Council are still likely to guard their intelligence 
superiority, but they may be convinced to allow the UN a systematic means (i.e., an 
OSINT system) to analyze the flood of data resident within the organization.  Small and 
large states will likely continue to have concerns about sovereignty and trust in the UN 
organization, but effective implementation of OSINT practices can confront these issues. 
2. Bureaucratic 
The Secretariat’s officials may still be a significant obstacle.  Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon’s proposed reforms to the UN bureaucracy stalled since he had not first 
built political momentum for change, according to Maggie Farley.354  The OSINT 
structure described in this thesis does not directly address the concern of turf-conscious 
bureaucrats defending their own fiefdoms.  On the other hand, if their home countries 
muster the political will to endorse intelligence reform, the bureaucrats may find they 
have the flexibility to adapt as well.  Using OSINT as a means to overcome political 
opposition is an indirect approach to confronting the bureaucracy.  As political will to 
improve peacekeeping intelligence coalesces and momentum for change builds, 
bureaucratic issues are likely to be easier to overcome.   
3. Structural 
A modification of the NATO OSINT doctrine to the UN context appears to offer a 
politically acceptable alternative to a traditional intelligence structure.  The transparent 
nature of OSINT coupled with the fact that so much information is already in the UN 
system could provide a route toward successful reform.  As it builds new peacekeeping 
doctrine, the UN could carefully define the scope of its analysis effort and explicitly rule  
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out the possibility of clandestine collection.  Building on the record of established 
JMACs, the UN could form a headquarters-level intelligence analysis organization based 
on the NATO OSINT framework. 
C. ADDRESSING THE CRITICS 
Intelligence is a key ingredient in a successful peace operation, and the UN has 
made great strides in improving its fledgling intelligence capacity.  Critics attack 
intelligence reform on the basis of necessity, sovereignty, and trust.  Though these 
arguments are not without merit, sensible implementation of intelligence practices 
addresses the issues. 
1. Why Intelligence? 
The Brahimi Report is a comprehensive review of the difficulties associated with 
peacekeeping operations.  Of 24 formal recommendations, only two directly address 
intelligence capabilities.  The remainder of the recommendations deal with topics as 
diverse as logistics, doctrine, humanitarian efforts, and finance.355  Although this thesis 
focuses specifically on intelligence reforms, the UN understands that many problems 
confront PKOs.  The organization has taken some steps toward fixing the non-
intelligence issues raised in the Brahimi Report.   
In late 2003, three years after the report’s publication, the Henry Stimson Center 
in Washington, DC published a comprehensive review of UN progress vis-à-vis 
Brahimi’s 24 recommendations.  The study’s authors, Robert Durch, Victoria Holt, 
Caroline Earle, and Moira Shanahan, explicitly broke out subtasks from the proposals, for 
a total of 81 different action items, only two of which deal with intelligence.  These two 
are: “Peacekeeping forces must have intelligence capabilities” and “better information 
gathering, analysis, and strategic planning (EISAS).”  Both come directly from the 
Brahimi report.356   
 
355 United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” Annex III, 54-58 
summarizes the recommendations. 
356 United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” 9, 13. 
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Durch et al rated progress on each recommendation according to the requirements 
set forth in the Brahimi Report.  They established a scale ranging from 0, 
“unimplemented,” to 5, “implementation exceeds report recommendations.”357  A full 27 
percent of the Brahimi Report’s recommendations had been implemented to the report’s 
standard or higher.358  The two intelligence-related tasks did not meet this benchmark.  
Durch et al gave each a score of 2.5, meaning that the intelligence recommendations were 
less than “partly implemented” even if some actions had been proposed within the 
   
The Stimson Center released its report in 2003, prior to the 2005 stand-up of 
JMACs in various field missions.  JMAC performance as described in Chapter III 
suggests that Durch et al could raise their assessment of the “Peacekeeping forces must 
have intelligence capabilities” task.  The Brahimi Report’s EISAS recommendation still 
has not been implemented, suggesting an unchanged score may be warranted for that 
task.  Given the significant progress Durch et al noted across the full spectrum of Brahimi 
Report recommendations, there is no evidence that addre
At the mission level, the success of JMACs suggests that member states 
comprehend the need for UN forces to understand their operational environment.  Taking 
to heart Brahimi’s recommendation, the UN has made a substantial effort to improve 
missions’ intelligence capability, though this capacity still has room to grow.  The 
enhancement of intelligence at the mission level is evidence that member 
rdinate political sovereignty concerns for operational effectiveness. 
At the strategic level, however, the UN has still not embraced the concept of an 
autonomous open source intelligence (OSINT) organization like Brahimi’s EISAS.  John 
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Otte believes actual implementation of such a capability is still years in the future.  
Encouraged by the success of JMACs, he believes that the potential for such a capacity is 
there, but it will take time for the politicians to work through the details to get to the 
implementation stage.360  An eventual EISAS-like organization is a distinct possibility, 
especially if th
Brahimi addresses the issue of information dependence, saying that “The 
Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to 
hear.”361  Here the report deals with the political acceptability of information, not strictly 
its analysis.  Too often, according to Brahimi, the Secretariat estimates mission 
requirements based on political expediency.362  An OSINT arm such as EISAS would not 
by itself depoliticize the use of information.  As Keohane says, knowledge is power in an 
international organization and large states are loath to surrender their advantage in this 
arena.  The implementation of the EISAS recommendation would, however, enhance 
member state trust.  This trust is essential to gain troop commitments for field 
operations.363  Additionally, trust in the decision-making process implies legitimacy—if 
not agreement—when the Security Council authorizes an operation.  Therefore, building 
up UN headquarters’ analytical capacity would be a major political step toward 
enhancing the acceptability of UN forces in the field.  States with an information 
monopoly, if serious about wanting an effective UN, will likely need to reduce their 
domination in this area.  Their sacrifice of information dominance could be matched by 
smaller states’ willingness to bend on sovereignty.  Large and small states coul
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page report on Kosovo which included intelligence on politics, infrastructure, and 
military tactics.367  These same commanders accepted a later classified version, despite 
                                                
 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
Since the Brahimi Report, operational and tactical intelligence efforts have seen 
the most gains.  Institutionalization of the JMAC concept is underway, and the ad hoc 
measures employed in MONUC may offer lessons for other operations.  Efforts to 
improve strategic intelligence at UN headquarters still lag behind.  The 24/7 Situation 
Centre is the closest thing to an intelligence organization, but, according to its own 
website, it is not tasked with an analytical function.364  The Brahimi Report co
 may be dead, but the requirement for intelligence has not gone away. 
Too often, in Mercado’s view, decision makers in government overlook open 
source information and rely instead on secret intelligence.  Mercado says secret 
information is preferred by those who confuse secrecy with accuracy or feel that 
clandestine sources are somehow preferable to open sources.365  While the relative worth 
of OSINT as compared to traditional classified intelligence may be subject to debate at 
the national level or within an alliance like NATO, the UN does not have this option.
ence cooperation; the same arguments could hold true for the UN as well.366 
Sometimes, the free availability of OSINT has an unfortunate cooling effect on 
military leaders.  For instance, many NATO commanders ignored an unclassified 400-
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the addition of only small details on weapons systems.368  Ironically, this obsession with 
“secret” information could prove to be a strength in the UN context.  Since transparency 
is key in the UN’s politicized environment, the lack of classified intelligence may be a 
key diplomatic selling point—member states could reasonably expect that the UN, 
lacking “secrets,” does not have all the details of their internal state affairs.  With so 
much information available in open sources, the actual difference between OSINT and 
secret intelligence may be little more than a semantic game in some cases.  That said, a 
perceived difference between OSINT and classified intelligence may be enough to save 
face in the diplomatic realm. 
Ironically, most of the information needed for peacekeeping operations is readily 
available to the UN.  All this information begs for analysis, making the UN a prime 
candidate for the institutionalization of an OSINT capability.  In many crises, particularly 
in the developing world, OSINT may be the only source of information available—even 
if a UN member state was willing to share its intelligence with the UN, the state may lack 
intelligence assets in the crisis area.369  With 1990s-type complex operations becoming 
the norm for the UN (for instance, continuing involvement in Congo, East Timor, 
Kosovo, etc), this information becomes critical.  With some modification, the UN could 
use NATO’s OSINT framework to turn freely available data into useable intelligence and 
distribute that intelligence throughout the organization and out to the field. 
This study has focused primarily on structural changes the UN could implement 
to improve its corporate ability to produce intelligence information.  Given the political 
and bureaucratic obstacles to successful implementation, the road ahead is likely to be 
liberally strewn with pot holes threatening to wreck the process.  Successful field 
employment of JMACs and the inclusion of intelligence in the ongoing development of 
peacekeeping doctrine suggest that intelligence reform may not be a matter of “if” but 
“when.”  Political consensus to back the institutionalization of UN intelligence may take 
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years to build.  In the interim, the UN will continue to lack a systematic means to provide 
intelligence support to its already overextended peacekeepers in the field. 
Having identified the NATO OSINT as a potential model for a UN intelligence 
organization, this study concedes that further research into UN intelligence functioning is 
still needed.  Analysis of how JMACs actually function in the field is lacking.  Existing 
documentation and JMAC performance studies are rare because the JMAC concept is 
relatively new.  As the various JMACs mature and more information becomes available, 
it may be possible to correlate JMAC activity and analysis to the operational success or 
failure of peacekeeping missions.  Another avenue for research is to study a NATO 
OSINT cell in comparison to a fielded JMAC.  It is possible that NATO could learn from 
the UN experience. 
The toughest step for intelligence reform will most likely be overcoming the 
political resistance to an institutionalized intelligence capability at UN headquarters.  As 
force protection becomes more important to UN missions, potential troop contributing 
states may seek assurances that the organization will do everything in its power to protect 
peacekeepers.  If members are unwilling to send troops, the UN will not be able to 
intervene anywhere.  The link between force protection and troop contribution potentially 
makes a functioning intelligence system a necessary condition for the conduct of future 
UN operations.  
UN peacekeeping has a mixed record ranging from relatively successful 
observation missions to failures like Bosnia and Somalia.  The organization has 
accomplished this without a full-fledged intelligence capability.  Though past 
performance is no guarantee of the future, it is likely the UN could continue to muddle 
through peace operations with existing ad hoc intelligence methods.  A functioning 
OSINT system is an alternative to both a complete lack of intelligence and a clandestine 
espionage agency.  The UN could adapt NATO’s existing model for OSINT production 
to meet the needs of the blue helmets peacekeepers in the field while simultaneously 
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